



**COORDINATING NATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMMES ON
SECURITY DURING MAJOR EVENTS IN EUROPE
(EU-SEC)**

MANUAL

**PROJECT FUNDED BY
DG RESEARCH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ERA-NET PROGRAMME**

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Introduction

The Security of Major Events

Planning security for major events almost always involves a considerable body of experience, knowledge and expertise. Successful security planners need to be knowledgeable about potential threats posed by terrorist groups, hooligans, protestors or organised crime groups. They have to be informed about circumstances and behaviours that may contribute to incidents. They need strategic and operational information to identify vulnerabilities in the defence system, evaluate risks and decide whether further action should be taken to reduce potential risks. They are also expected to be experienced with emergency solutions to be taken in case natural disasters and man-made emergencies occur during the event.

Moreover, solid knowledge about jurisdictional, cultural and environmental issues would help security planners to foster cooperation and coordination. Knowledge such as participating agencies' capabilities and culture, conflicts between participants or jurisdictional restraints would support planners' distribution of responsibilities, enhance agencies' interaction and identify assignments' limitations.

Equally important is information on international media reporting on the major events, considering that potential incidents or organisational gaps could cause exposure, embarrassment and public panic.

Finally, security planners should be knowledgeable on how to ensure that countries that host major international events can gain long-term benefits from planned security. In particular, a legacy knowledge and a planning culture could ensure that the resources and know-how made available for major events such as infrastructure, training and technology solutions would enhance overall national capabilities and improve daily routine activities after the event.

Unfortunately for security planners, this international body of knowledge and expertise cannot be reproduced and distributed in a universal blueprint or an international security manual applicable to any kind of major event. Perspectives on, and approaches to, organising security differ considerably from event to event and from country to country. Policies, strategies and tactical operations should be adapted to the current level of threats, the human resources, technological solutions available, the local legislative conditions, the political aspirations and other crucial factors. For example, since 11 September 2001, the security plans have strengthened security measures related to airspace interdiction and restricted policies and procedures to gain entry to a venue or non-venue site. Moreover security plans are not governed by fix and unchangeable rules that security officers have to strictly follow. Apart from the opening and closing days, there is little certainty. Plans need to be developed as flexibly as possible to cater for the inevitable changes that could emerge during the event. Flexibility and adaptation are key concepts that security planners have to take into consideration when they plan and implement security of major events.

In view of all these challenges, managing security for major events cannot depend exclusively on the capabilities and know-how of the hosting countries, but it should more largely rely on the ability

of the latter to share information with other countries that participate in the event and/or that have developed significant expertise and good practices by hosting previous similar events. The key for successful security operations for major events are collaboration and coordination. Exchange of information is of the utmost importance to contribute to public order, peace and safety and effective use of the available resources. Information sharing is also a key to facilitate international police cooperation regarding the police approach to the major events.

The outcome of the major event security largely depends on how successfully authorities organising the event can find and access this international body of knowledge. Without extensive collaboration and coordination among countries, no security planners can gather enough information to face potential challenges and avoid the shortcomings of the previous major events.

The EU has a long history of regarding aspects of public order maintenance as a matter of *common concern* going back to the post-1975 TREVI system on co-operation which included a focus on football hooliganism intelligence and policing. The European Union has clearly recognized the need for joint international coordination of protective security at major events. As it will be shown, many EU and council resolutions and recommendations have been produced in order to assist the international cooperation and to synchronize national approaches, including guidelines and handbooks for the use of police authorities.

However, more work needs to be done to improve the cooperation and coordination of efforts among European States. One of the problems that have to be addressed is that much existing knowledge is tacit, known only to practitioners and not made available for further research and/or analysis. Security planning is more closely related to the working practice than to research communities. The available know-how is not converted into research or even written reports, but is part of the verbal society inside the heads of experienced commanders. Moreover, the absence of common definitions of “technical terminology”, such as ‘Major Event’, hinders efforts to improve operational cooperation among States. Equally important, the existence of different approaches and methodologies to study and draft security plans thwarts transnational cooperation. Last but not least, coordination and cooperation are delayed by the lack of a comprehensive structure or methodology that facilitates exchange of lessons, practices and insights on the European level across different major events (political, sporting events).

The EU-SEC Project

All these problems have come to the attention of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in recent years. In 2003, UNICRI, in collaboration with EUROPOL, created the International Programme Observatory (IPO), a body composed of security planners whose main purpose has been to assist and provide services to national authorities responsible for designing and delivering security plans for future major events.¹ The main activity organised within the framework of the Observatory has been the gathering of experienced security planners during closed-door meetings at UNICRI Headquarters in Turin. Addressing specific topics such as accreditation strategies or intelligence analysis, these meetings helped UNICRI bring together a bulk of knowledge on security of major events. Through IPO expertise, UNICRI undertook the challenging exercise to develop a common language and methodology, identifying major elements that security planners should take into consideration whilst planning security of major events.² In 2006 the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) acknowledged the

¹ For more information see IPO website: www.unicri-ipo.org.

² The main analytic/methodological outcomes of IPO are a Toolkit for Security Planners and a Planning Guide.

importance of UNICRI's activities by approving the Resolution E/CN.15/2006/L.11/Rev.1 that solicited the UN Member States hosting a Major Event to contribute and take advantage of the mentor services offered by IPO.³

The next step of UNICRI's activities in the field of security of major event was offered by the ERA-NET Programme of the European Commission. As part of the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (2002-2006), the ERA-NET Programme aimed to develop and foster the European Research Area. In particular, ERA-NET was designed to step up the cooperation and coordination of national or regional research activities through the networking of existing research programmes, including the development and implementation of joint activities.

In line with this policy and boosted by IPO results, in 2004 UNICRI conceived, in collaboration with Europol, the project *Coordinating National Research Programmes on Security during Major Events in Europe* (EU-SEC) as a contribution of the United Nations to the configuration of an effective European Research Area in the field of security during major events. This four-year project, fully funded by the European Commission, was launched in partnership with EUROPOL and ten Member States of the European Union: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see Tab. 1). UNICRI acted as the coordinator of the project while each partner was entrusted with a specific task in the execution of the project. Moreover, a Network Steering Committee, chaired by UNICRI and composed of one national expert per participating country, met regularly to supervise activities and ensure the quality of the envisaged deliverables.

Table 1. Partners of the EU-SEC Project

Partner 1: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in Italy
Partner 2: European Police Agency (EUROPOL) in Netherlands
Partner 3: Bundesministerium fur Inneres/Ministry of Interior (BM.I) in Austria
Partner 4: German Police University (DHPol)
Partner 5: Ministerio del Interior (MIR) in Spain
Partner 6: Ministry of the Interior - Police College of Finland (SM PO)
Partner 7: Direction de la Formation de la Police Nationale (D.G.P.N) in France
Partner 8: London Metropolitan Police (MetPo) in the United Kingdom
Partner 9: An Garda Síochana in Ireland
Partner 10: Ministero degli Interni - Dipartimento Pubblica Sicurezza - Ufficio Ordine Pubblico (Min Interno) in Italy
Partner 11: Ministry of Justice (Min JUS) in the Netherlands
Partner 12: Cabinet of the Ministry of Interior (GCS/MAI) in Portugal

The EU-SEC Project took the following steps towards the creation of a common European Research Area:

- Improving the **exchange of information** among participating countries on the existing national programmes on security during Major Events.
- Performing strategic activities aimed at identifying best practices, possible complementarities and gaps among programmes, new opportunities in research, practical and legal barriers that hindered transnational cooperation and management of available human and financial resources.

³ Moreover, in 2006 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution encouraging the United Nations to work with Member States and relevant international, regional and sub-regional organisations to identify and share best practices on preventing terrorist attacks against particularly vulnerable targets.

- Developing **common strategies** and improving **coordination** of national programmes to address common needs, including the exploration of innovative solutions to bridge gaps between theory, policy and practice of securing major events.
- Developing **common transnational research programmes**.
- Exploring and studying the way in which **ethical issues** are taken into consideration during major events, highlighting problems and best practices.

Ideally, this common research area should assist European policymakers in their quest to design coherent, mutually consistent and effective policies for securing major events in the EU.

The EU-SEC Project produced the following outcomes:

- A **Restricted portal** through which the project partners shared relevant documentation, research and analysis results related to security of major events (www.eu-sec.org/extranet).
- A **Common database** on existing research on security planning during major events.
- An effective **Methodology** for organising and boosting a common research activity of the participating partners.
- A **Transnational call for proposals** elaborated and launched with the aim to fill existing research gaps and provide law enforcement agencies with new concrete instruments for improving the security level at major events.
- A **Report on ethical issues at Major Events**.
- A **Manual** on the main results of EU-SEC.

The EU-SEC Manual

The EU-SEC Manual has been thought as an instrument to explore the requirements necessary to create a European Research Area on security of major events. Based on the activities and outcomes of the EU-SEC Project, the Manual followed three logical steps:

- 1) offering a snapshot of the existing research programmes;
- 2) identifying unknown research areas and exploring blind spots in the existing research agenda;
- 3) proposing and testing a common coordination methodology elaborated during the four-year EU-SEC Project.

The main sources of the Manual are the outcomes of the activities performed by the EU-SEC Partners. The project was based on a step-by-step approach, divided into six work packages (WP) (see Tab. 2). Each partner was responsible for developing a specific task within each work package (see Tab. 3). As will be shown, information and data to draft the chapters of the Manual have been collected through meeting and discussions among partners and reports that partners elaborated at the end of their tasks.

Tab. 2 Work Packages of the EU-SEC Project

Work Package 1	Systematic exchange of information and best practices
Work Package 2	Strategic activities
Work Package 3	Implementation of joint activities
Work Package 4	Transnational research activities

Work Package 5	Ethical issues
Work Package 6	Manual

Tab. 3 Tasks of Work Packages

TASK	TASK LEADER
1.1 Kick off meeting	UNICRI
1.2 Description of the status quo on research programmes	GCS/MAI (Portugal)
1.3 Implementation of a common secure portal	UNICRI
1.4 Meeting: presentation of the status quo	An Garda Siochana (Ireland)
2.1 Identification of complementarities and gaps among national research programmes	SM PO (Finland)
2.2 Assessment of the obstacles that hinder the coordination of research programmes	MetPo (United Kingdom)
2.3 Reflection on possible ways to optimise the management of existing available resources	BM.I (Austria)
2.4 Meeting: presentation of the results & ideas for possible joint activities	Mir (Spain)
3.1 Identification of a proper methodology to coordinate research programmes on security during major events	D.F.P.N. (France)
3.2 Meeting: presentation of the results & launch of the pilot call for proposals	MinJus (The Netherlands)
3.3 Implementation of the pilot call for proposals	EUROPOL
4.1 Description of the final transnational call for proposals	D.F.P.N. (France)
4.2 Final meeting and launch of the transnational call for proposals	MinInterno (Italy)
5 Ethical issues related to security during major events	DHPol (Germany)
6 Manual on the results of EU-SEC	UNICRI

The Manual is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter (based on Task 1.2) offers some operative definitions of ‘major event’, ‘security’ and ‘research programme’, as a first step toward the development of a common “European Research Area”. The second chapter (based on Task 1.2) provides an overview of the national research projects on security at major events that have so far been developed by the EU-SEC partners, while the third chapter (based on Task 2.1) analyses these projects and identifies some complementarities and gaps. The next chapter (based on Task 2.1) develops some proposals for future transnational research activities among the EU-SEC partners. Then chapter five (based on Tasks 2.2 and 2.3) offers an analysis of what resources are available for developing joint transnational research activities, while chapter six (based on Tasks 3.1, 3.3 and 4.1) proposes ideas for effectively implementing these activities in cooperation with the private sector. Before the final conclusions, chapter seven (based on Task 5) explores to what extent the coordination of research activities takes ethical issues into consideration.

Chapter 1

Operative Definitions of Key Concepts

Before conducting an analysis on the national research programmes on major event security, all the EU-SEC partners agreed to adopt some common definitions on three key concepts: ‘major event’, ‘research programme’ and ‘security’. As indicated in the table below, the definitions were not formulated overnight, but they were the result of a year’s work in meetings, discussions and reports among the EU-SEC Project partners. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore all the steps that led the partners to agree upon common definitions. The chapter is mainly based on a task led by the Internal Security Coordinating Office (GCS) of the Portuguese Minister of the Interior (MAI).⁴

Chronologically speaking, the milestones of this part of the EU-SEC Project were:

- Kick-off meeting among the EU-SEC Partners and 1st meeting of the Network Steering Committee (Turin, 2-3 December 2004);
- Meeting between UNICRI and Portugal to agree on a framework within which to draft the questionnaire (Lisbon, 27-28 January 2005);
- Preliminary questionnaire titled *List of Forms taken by Major Events* (drafted by the Portuguese GCS/MAI and circulated to all partner in March 2005);
- Meeting among UNICRI, Portugal, Finland and Ireland to present the report of the preliminary questionnaire and review the common definitions (Dublin, 4-5 April 2005);
- Questionnaire (re-drafted by GCS/MAI and circulated to all partners at the end of June 2005);
- 2nd meeting of the Network Steering Committee to present and discuss the final draft of the questionnaire (Paris, 9-10 June 2005);
- Preliminary meeting between UNICRI, EUROPOL, Austria, Finland, Spain and the UK to prepare for the launch of Work Package 2 in December 2005 (Helsinki, 15 September 2005);
- 3rd meeting of the Network Steering Committee (Dublin, 8 December 2005);
- 4th meeting of the Network Steering Committee (Southampton, 31 May 2006).

1.1 Definition of a Major Event

The first definition of major event was proposed by UNICRI and Portugal after a meeting held in Lisbon on the 27th-28th January 2005.

Major Event #1 - Lisbon Definition:

All the events that, due to the quality or quantity of persons they mobilise, or to the time and place they occur, involve threats or risks documented in security plans.

February 2005

This definition of major event was further developed on other occasions. The first was provided by the drafting of a preliminary questionnaire (titled *List of Forms taken by Major Events*) that the

⁴ Portugal was the leader of the task 1.2 *Description of the Status Quo on Research Programmes*.

author, Portugal, discussed with the EU-SEC partners. This exercise was an important step towards an “operative” definition since partners provided practical examples of what they considered as major events. Subsequently, a meeting in Dublin (4-5 April 2005) provided more “food for thoughts”, and after further discussions, a working definition for ‘major event’ was eventually incorporated into Portugal’s final questionnaire, which was circulated to the partners in June 2005.

Major Event #2 - Dublin/Questionnaire Definition:

Any gathering of people, characterized by one or more of the following:

- 1) Historical and/or political significance and/or popularity;
- 2) Large media coverage and/or international media attendance;
- 3) Participation of citizens from different countries and/or possible target groups;
- 4) Participation of dignitaries and/or VIPs;
- 5) More than 200,000 expected to be present at the event;

AND

has produced, or is likely to produce (in the view of the host security planning country) relevant practices and/or research with regard to one or more of the specific categories of security threats* envisaged in the EU-SEC project.

*(Threats to/of: public safety; public order; terrorism; criminality and delinquency; violent unauthorised demonstrations; other events potentially embarrassing to the authorities).

April/August 2005

At the 2nd Network Steering Committee in Paris (8-9 June 2005), members unanimously agreed that Portugal should continue to work on the definition of a major event, regularly updating it on the basis of the development of the EU-SEC Project. UNICRI’s report of the meeting recorded that “*the final goal is to elaborate a common definition of ‘major event’ shared by all 25 EU countries and, possibly, adopted by relevant EU Institutions*”⁵.

The definition of major event was comprehensively reviewed by Dr. Marc Otten in UNICRI’s drafting of the *Toolkit for policy makers and practitioners* in the field of major event security planning. Observing that no universally accepted definition of major event currently existed, Otten noted that such a definition could be arrived at objectively or subjectively:

Objectively	Subjectively
Defined by the quality or quantity of people they mobilise, or the time and place they occur in, and threats they thereby attract.	Defined by their requirement for knowledge, skills or resources in excess of those readily available to key participants.

The initial Lisbon definition and its development primarily reflected the more objective style and it was based upon the ‘common characteristics’ of past events that national authorities had treated as ‘major’. However, the survey also made clear that the extra-ordinariness of the event to the host country might be even more defining than characteristics of the event itself. As a result, the Dublin definition adopted in April 2005 was a combination of both these elements.

⁵ UNICRI, *Report of the Second Meeting of the Network Steering Committee*, 2005.

Recognising the validity of both an objective and subjective element, as well as the central element of threats and potential threats as a defining feature, the 3rd Network Steering Committee (Dublin, December 2005) eventually stated that the following operational definition was “valid for the EU-SEU project” and would have been submitted “by UNICRI to the relevant EU political authorities for consideration”⁶:

Major Event #3 - Operational Definition

A Major Event is a foreseeable event that should have at least one of the following characteristics

1. Historical, political significance or popularity
2. Large media coverage and/or international media attendance
3. Participation of citizens from different countries and/or possible target group
4. Participation of VIPs and/or dignitaries
5. High numbers of persons

and poses the potential of threats and therefore may require international cooperation and assistance.

December 2005

In this definition the potential of threats and requirement of international cooperation were the two defining elements of a foreseeable event that would make it ‘major’ in the opinion of the host national authority. This definition could also command common recognition among partner EU countries.

1.2 Definition of a Research Programme

The below definition of ‘research programmes’ consists of UNICRI’s original proposal. It reflected that used by the European Commission’s ERA-NET programme and was first circulated among the EU-SEC Consortium partners by the Portuguese GCS/MAI in February 2005, to gather comments regarding its future use as a key concept in the EU-SEC project.

Research Programmes #1 - Original Definition (UNICRI based on ERA-NET)

Research programmes should be understood as entire research and innovation programmes, or part of such programmes, or similar initiatives, which are documented. Research may also consist of analysis, studies, production and/or elaboration of the results of workshops, seminars and training courses.

February 2005

Afterwards, Portugal, in agreement with UNICRI, drafted a similar definition in the questionnaire that was circulated to the EU-SEC Partners at the end of June 2005.

⁶ UNICRI, *Report of the Third Meeting of the Network Steering Committee*, 2005.

Research Programmes #2 – Questionnaire Definition

Research programmes for our purposes should be understood as entire research and innovation programmes, or part of such programmes, or similar initiatives, which are documented. In particular research may consist of:

- 1) Internal police research:
 - a) Documented security plans and related preparatory material,
 - b) Research based on consultation with existing external data bases,
 - c) Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies,
 - d) Acts of conferences and/or workshops organised by a project partner,
 - e) Training material (preparatory documentation and/or proceedings of training)
 - f) Reports (for instance post action reports and evaluation reports)
- 2) Research by external/academics requested by governmental institutions;
- 3) Research by independent external/academics used by the police

June 2005

With this list of possible elements, the questionnaire meant to capture measurable data on national research programmes. However, while answering to the Portuguese questionnaire, the EU-SEC partners raised new issues. In particular, they put forward three new observations.

The first one was that the *police often consider not only long-term “developmental research”, but also shorter term “operational research” as belonging to the category of research programmes.* That is, not only scientific processes of research on topics and questions relating to major event security (i.e. developmental study), but also routine preparatory research processes that lay behind the production of knowledge. In other words, a research programme is seen as any practical exercise, including threat assessments, intelligence gatherings or debriefings, whereby security planners become knowledgeable and ready for a specific major event.

Initially at the Kick Off meeting, the stated objectives of the ERA-NET programme mentioned: “to step up the cooperation and coordination of national/regional research activities and the networking of programmes”. By ‘programmes’ it meant “entire research and innovation programmes, or part of such programmes, or similar initiatives”. These were envisaged as being “strategically planned programmes carried out at national/regional level” and financed/managed either directly or indirectly by national/regional public bodies/authorities⁷. In other words, these definitions implied some long-term programmes of “developmental research” carried out by or on behalf of the national authority.

However, the reactions to the preliminary questionnaire showed that “operational research” played a key role in order to explore what was known and researched by the EU-SEC partners.

The second observation was that *the definition of research programmes should also capture tacit knowledge, that is to say knowledge which was not documented.*

At the Helsinki EU-SEC meeting in September 2005, there was general acknowledgement that the ‘national research programmes’ should be understood as “existing in documented form”. However,

⁷ UNICRI, *Report of the Kick Off Meeting*, 2005.

the preliminary results of the questionnaire indicated that there was national ‘research’ that was not documented in the traditional form. In other words, most of the knowledge related to security planning for major events was transmitted in oral form rather than documented. Therefore, it was suggested that the ‘research programme’ should also refer to tacit knowledge.

The third observation concerned the term ‘research’. If ‘research’ is considered as ‘the use of information to answer questions’ and/or ‘the establishment of facts to reach new conclusions’⁸ then a crucial element being referred to is the very set of questions to be answered or old conclusions/orthodoxies concerning a given subject, to be challenged by the said research process. And it is the *identification of these basic research ‘questions’* and/or old orthodoxies concerning the subject of security during major events in Europe (and perhaps their strategic cogency as a coherent body of distinct questions rather than a list of disparate topics) that should form a (documented) ‘programme’ of research at a national (and even trans-national) level for the purpose of its research subject’s development.

In the attempt to include these suggestions without altering the sense of the original EU-SEC’s definition, a revised definition of ‘research programme’ was mutated at the Dublin meeting in the following terms:

Research Programmes #3 - Operational Definition

A research programme is any documented programme (in whole or part) of research and innovation (or similar initiative) carried out by or on behalf of, or referred to by, an EU Member State’s national authority (or body recognised by them) on the subject of security during major events in Europe.

‘Research’ means the establishment of facts to answer questions and/or reach new conclusions in respect of existing knowledge on the research subject.

‘Programme’ means a coherent set of questions or issues in relation to the research subject to be pursued through research activity over a given period of time in the name of the national authority.

‘Innovation’ means the introduction of new topics, themes and/or ideas in relation to the research subject and includes the development of existing topics, themes and/or idea towards new form.

1.3 Definition of Security

The first provisional definition was elaborated during a meeting between UNICRI and the Portuguese GCS/MAI in January 2005 and included in the Portuguese questionnaire.

Security#1 - Lisbon Definition

In terms of outcomes, ‘security’ can be defined as the absence of various foreseeable adverse or unwanted facts that can cause harm during a major event. Security always refers to threat evaluation and how to prevent potential risks from happening.

February 2005

⁸ Research has been defined in a police oriented research and evaluation manual simply as ‘the use of information to answer questions’ (Hibberd 1990:2).

A similar definition was suggested by the first version of the IPO Toolkit.

Security #2 – IPO Toolkit Definition

In terms of outcomes, security can be defined as the absence of various adverse events that can cause harm during a major event. Security therefore always refers to threats - the potential of events causing harm - while security tools refer to all instruments at the disposal of the authorities and organisers to prevent threats from materialising.

December 2005

The IPO definition made the distinction between ‘security’ as an outcome status (or condition) – i.e. the absence of the materialisation of a threat, and ‘security tools’ as the means by which that status is achieved. Other than that, the two definitions were strikingly similar. In essence they both seemed to be saying the same thing: that ‘security’ is the absence of harm *precisely due* to the planner’s actual prevention of it. In this sense, security is defined in terms of its *outcome*.

The definitions therefore both suggested that security can only be said to exist in practice when it has been *actually tested* by the reality of a potential threat. Until then the claim that an event is ‘secure’ can only be made at the theoretical level. This may well be the case in most cases (i.e. that most events pass without a significant incident to test security measures).

Without detracting from either of the above two definitions, SM PO suggested a reduced version of the definition:

Security #3 – Reduced Definition

‘Security’ is the absence of potentially harmful threats through the event organiser's and/or national authority’s prevention of their materialisation as harm.

June 2006

Or to put it even more simply, ‘security’ is the prevented harm of a threat.

Chapter 2

Overview of Research Projects on Major Event Security

Once identified some standard definitions of the key terms, it is now possible to explore how the ten EU-SEC participating countries have conducted research projects on security at major events. The chapter at hand is divided in two parts. The first part describes the methodology for collecting data and information from the EU-SEC countries. The second part offers a general picture of those events that were considered ‘major’ by the EU-SEC partners, and the third part describes main aspects of the national research activities.

The chapter is mainly based on a task led by the Internal Security Coordinating Office (GCS) of the Portuguese Minister of the Interior (MAI).⁹ The task was carried out by a team composed of a sociologist researcher, an applied social researcher and SPSS/Excel expert, and a native English translator. This team was supported by two senior police officers who oversaw technical aspects related to the police and security.

2.1 The methodology for data collection

As a first step of the activities of the EU-SEC Project, the Portuguese GCS/MAI, in agreement with UNICRI, prepared a questionnaire that was completed by the EU-SEC Project Partners. The purpose of the questionnaire was to collect information on recent, current and forthcoming research programmes performed by the EU-SEC Partners.

In drafting the questionnaire, Portugal considered the following needs:

- The questionnaire should target key police specialists and departments involved in the security planning process for Major Events.
- It was important to ensure consistency in the data collection. For this purpose, as it has been seen, the questionnaire suggested some operative definitions of ‘major event’, ‘security’ and ‘research programme’.
- The structure of the questionnaire should be based on a comprehensive framework, able to include all known security topics such as threat identification, crowd management, media management, public information, etc. The IPO Programme provided an excellent solution to this need.
- The questionnaire should capture practical information based on past major events.
- The final result should be a survey rather than a research¹⁰.

The result was a questionnaire divided into two parts: Part A and Part B (see Annex 2). Part A was specifically designed to collect general information on the national research programmes, while Part B focused on case studies identified by each Project Partner. More specifically, Part A was designed to identify the leading organisations for national research programmes on security during major

⁹ Portugal was in charge of contacting all project Partners and preparing a questionnaire to collect information on national research programmes with regard to security of major events. In August 2005 the questionnaire circulated among security planners and national authorities of the EU-SEC participating countries, who satisfactorily answered most of the questions. Subsequently, Portugal produced a report that analysed information and data collected through the questionnaire.

¹⁰ Within the ERA-NET scheme, research was not eligible for funding.

events, the main bibliographical references, and the main issues that, according to partners, had to be further developed by national research programmes (questions 3-6). In particular, Part A offered to expert practitioners the opportunity to express their personal and professional opinions about potential new issues that should be included in future research programmes (question 4)¹¹.

The second part, Part B, was meant to capture much more detailed information on thirty major events that were hosted by the EU-SEC Partners. By formulating over 80 questions per each event, the questionnaire attempted to collect measurable data and specific references to the national research programmes on major event security. Part B was divided into 5 sections. The first section included descriptive questions meant to capture central features of the events hosted by the EU-SEC partners, including information on the type of event, duration, location(s) and other important dimensions of the event (questions 7-11). Questions were also asked on the nature of the security plans and key documents used in preparation of the event (questions 12-16). The second section concerned the assessments of security threats, vulnerabilities and risks related to the major events hosted by EU-SEC partners, including threats posed by terrorism, criminality and delinquency or by unauthorised demonstrations (questions 17-48). The third section, titled “Risk-based Capabilities and Intervention”, was designed to collect information on national security plans, including special legal provisions, inter-agency cooperation, organisational structures, police intervention, training, budget, equipment and detection policies (questions 49-77). These questions were partly meant to give an idea of topics and issues that might be of interest for further analysis. The fourth section was titled “Crisis Management and Control”. Here questions concerned crisis management policies and procedures enlisted by national security plans (questions 78-95). The final section focused on lessons learned and on how knowledge was disseminated to other agencies responsible for providing security of future major events (questions 96-105).

2.2 Major events in the EU

Part B of the questionnaire provided a good first exploration of the many dimensions of major events. Although the questionnaire was addressed only to 10 out of the 25 EU Countries, information collected gave a clear indication of those events that were considered major by the EU-SEC partners.


The partners were asked to identify the three most important major events held in their respective countries. These events should match the criteria set by the Dublin working definition of ‘major event’ and fell within one of the following categories: high-level summit, major football events, large-scale cultural events, major religious events/celebrations, Olympics or other major comparable sporting event, and social or political protests/demonstrations.

On the basis of the answers, 30 major events were selected by the Partners¹².

¹¹ Other questions were included but dealt with administrative issues such as the name and contact information of the person filling in the questionnaire.

¹² In addition to the 30 major events, Belgium offered to make a voluntary contribution to the information gathered about UEFA EURO 2000, since this event was co-organized by Belgium and The Netherlands together. Given that two countries were involved, it was decided to consider the information gathered about the same major football event separately, which resulted in a total of 31 major events in analysis.

Figure 1



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q9)

As Figure 1 shows, there were differences in the proportions of major events within the selected categories. High-level summits represent the largest number of major events selected by Partners (33%), followed by major football events (23%), large-scale cultural events, and major religious events or celebrations (16%). The categories of Olympics and social or political protests/demonstrations represented both 6% of the major events.


Table 1. Categories of major event in analysis by country

Countries	Olympics or other major comparable sporting event	Major football events	High level summits	Social or political protests/ demonstrations	Large-scale cultural events	Major religious events/ celebrations
Austria		1	1			1
Finland		1	1	1		
France		1	1			1
Germany				1	2	
Ireland	1		2			
Italy		1	1			1
Portugal		1			2	
Spain	1		1			1
The Netherlands		1	1			1
The United Kingdom			2		1	
Belgium		1				
Total	2	7	10	2	5	5

As shown in Figure 2, all the major events selected by the Partners took place in the recent past: 53% between 2004 and 2005, 37% between 2000 and 2003, and only 10% between 1998 and 1999. As for the time duration, Figure 3 suggests that more than 60% of the major events lasted no more than a week (38% one week and 23% one day). The remaining percentage was almost equally distributed between two-week events (13%), almost a month events (10%) and six-month events (13%). As shown in Figure 3, There was only one case in which the duration of the major event lasted more than six months.¹³


Most of the 31 major events selected were international in scope (83%), while a smaller proportion was national (10%), and regional (7%) (see Figure 4). In addition, 66% of the major events took place in a city or at a specific place, 27% in different cities or regions and 7% across a region (see Figure 5).

Figure 2



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q3)


Figure 3



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q4)


¹³ The two European Football Championships selected lasted 23 days each, while the FIFA WORLD CUP lasted 30 days.

Figure 4



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q7)


Figure 5



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q8)

With reference to the predefined categories enlisted in the EU-SEC definition of major event, Figure 6 shows that the partners considered an event as major when it was characterised by a ‘large-scale media coverage and/or international media attendance’ in 97% of the cases, ‘participation of dignitaries and/or VIPs’ in 81% of the cases, and ‘participation of citizens from different countries and/or possible target groups’ in 74% of the cases. In lesser proportions, characteristics like ‘historical and/or political significance and/or popularity’ (65%), and ‘more than 200,000 expected to be present at the event’ (45%) were also indicated.

Figure 6




Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q10)

As shown in Figure 7, for most of the major events selected by Partners, general plans were drafted specifically for the event in question (84%). The information collected revealed that each major event had on average more than one security plan of different scopes. Type-plans (directives, operation orders, etc.) were used in 55% of the major events selected, followed by regional plans and plans from different bodies (both in 42% of cases), and finally, plans drafted for the different public bodies involved (39%), and others (3%).

As shown in Table 2, general plans were drafted in all major football events, religious events/celebrations, and the Olympics or other major comparable sporting events. General plans were also prepared in 80% of high level summits and 60% of large-scale cultural events. Regional plans were drafted for the Olympics and other major comparable sporting events. Moreover, the security plans were prepared for the different public bodies involved, especially in case of major football events, while they were drafted by the different bodies for the specific event of reference especially in the case of large-scale cultural events.

Figure 7



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q11)

Table 2. Scopes of the security plans for major events in analysis by category

Countries	Olympics or other major comparable sporting event (N= 2)	Major football events (N=7)	High level summits (N= 10)	Social or political protests/ demonstrations (N= 2)	Large-scale cultural events (N= 5)	Major religious events/ celebrations (N= 5)
General plan drafted for the event	2 100%	7 100%	8 80%	1 50%	3 60%	5 100%
Regional plans drafted for the event	2 100%	3 43%	5 50%	1 50%	1 20%	1 20%
Plans drafted for the different public bodies involved	1 50%	5 71%	4 40%	-	-	2 40%
Plans from the different bodies drafted for the event	1 50%	3 43%	4 40%	-	3 60%	2 40%
Type-plans	2 100%	3 43%	6 60%	-	3 60%	3 60%
Others	-	-	-	-	-	1 20%

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q9/Q11)

2.3 Research programmes: current status quo

In the attempt to identify national research programmes on major event security, the Portuguese questionnaire identified four main categories:

1. Security plans, reference manuals or other preparatory materials, and evaluation reports on security during major events or other similar studies;
2. The general bibliography on the subject used or adopted by the police forces in the planning phases;
3. Research centres;
4. Research underlying the assessment of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks, and the risk-based capabilities and interventions during major events, defined in the respective security plans;

The section below describes the four categories in details.

2.3.1 Security plans, manuals and evaluation reports

The EU-SEC partners made available 26 **security plans**. They pertained to 12 major events in 7 different countries and were grouped into 4 categories (see Table 3).

Moreover, all the Partners indicated 60 **national research programmes** that were adopted during the preparation of their security plans (see Table 4). The research programmes were predominantly internal police research, particularly assessment reports of past events, manuals, lesson reports or security checklists, officially instituted security regulations, national legislation, and, in a few cases, research conducted by specialised police departments. In addition, there were 3 studies conducted by external bodies/academics and requested by governmental institutions, and 2 researches performed by independent external bodies/academics and used by the police.

The research programmes concerned included: major football events in France, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium; major religious events or celebrations in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands; large-scale cultural events in Germany and Portugal, and high level summits in Italy.

In addition, some of the partners provided references to **post-event reports** that the hosting countries produced after the major event took place. More specifically, there were reports on 19 of the 31 major events selected (see Table 5). Most of these reports were based upon internal police research. The major football events attracted the largest number of studies, with a total of 9 distributed across different institutional contexts, 4 for social or political protests/demonstrations, 3 for high-level summits, and 2 respectively for large-scale cultural events and major religious events or celebrations.

Table 3. Accessible security plans for major events by country

Category of Major Event	General	Regional	Public Bodies
Major Football Events	France Italy Portugal The Netherlands Belgium	The Netherlands	Portugal The Netherlands Belgium
High Level Summits	Italy		
Large-scale Cultural Events	Germany		Portugal
Major religious events or celebrations	Austria Italy The Netherlands	Austria	The Netherlands

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q12)

Table 4. Types of internal police research for planning security during major events by country

Category of Major Event	Reports of Former Events	Manuals, Lesson Reports or Checklists	Rules/ Orders and Legislation	Particular Research Projects
Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Events		Ireland Spain		
Major Football Events	Portugal The Netherlands	Austria The Netherlands Belgium	Finland Italy Belgium	
High Level Summits	France Italy United Kingdom	Ireland Spain The Netherlands United Kingdom	Austria Finland Italy	The Netherlands United Kingdom
Social or Political Protests/Demonstrations		Finland	Germany	
Large-scale Cultural Events		United Kingdom Austria	Germany Portugal Austria	
Major Religious Events/ Celebrations	France Italy	Spain The Netherlands	Italy	The Netherlands

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q13 – 16)

Table 5. Studies and reports into security evaluation during major events by country

Category of Major Event	Reports of Former Events	Manuals, Lesson Reports or Checklists	Rules/ Orders and Legislation
Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Events	Spain (not specified)	-	-
Major Football Events	Austria France Italy (not specified) Portugal The Netherlands (not specified) Belgium	Portugal The Netherlands	Portugal
High Level Summits	Austria France Italy (Not specified) Spain (Not specified) United Kingdom	-	-
Social or Political Protests/Demonstrations	Germany	Germany	Germany
Large-scale Cultural Events	Germany United Kingdom	-	-
Major Religious Events/Celebrations	Austria France Italy (Not specified) Spain (Not specified)	-	-

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q 98 – 101)

2.3.2 General bibliography

From eight responding Partners, 65 **bibliographic references** were collected on security during major events or related subjects (see Table 6). These included 33 books, 16 articles/journals and 16 documents/reports.

Despite the large number of works collected, which forms an initial step towards the development of a common research area, the Portuguese experts expressed concern that there were many other documents which were not mentioned by the countries. The main problem was that the questionnaire mainly captured information on ‘operational research’, instead of ‘developmental research’. Therefore, Portuguese experts considered that the list of documents collected may not be representative of the knowledge produced and published on security during major events and/or related subjects.

Table 6. References on security by country

Contributions by country	Books /Publisher	Articles/Journals	Documents/Reports
Finland	11	7	8
France	2	2	1
Ireland	-	-	1
Italy	-	-	1
Portugal	13	2	-
Spain	-	-	3
United Kingdom	-	-	2
Belgium	7	5	-
Total	33	16	16

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part A (Q4)

3.3.3 Research centres

According to the answers provided by ten Partners, there were 28 **national research centres** on security at major events or related subjects, based in 9 countries. As shown in Table 7, 75% of these centres were integrated into police organisations or Ministries of the Interior, 18% were universities, and 7% were independent organizations.

As in the previous case, the Portuguese experts observed that there were difficulties in the collection of information and that the list of research centres could not be considered complete.

The fact that there were few references to research programmes outside police organizations could be interpreted as a sign that there were barriers or obstacles impeding the coordination of national research programmes.

Table 7. Institutional framework of the research centres on security during major events by country

Countries with Research Centres	Police or Ministry of Interior	Universities	Independent centres
Finland	8	1	
France	1		
Germany	4	3	1
Ireland	1		
Italy	1		
Portugal	4	1	
Spain	1		
The Netherlands			1
Belgium	1		
Total (N=28)	21 (75%)	5 (18%)	2 (7%)

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part A (Q3)

2.3.4 Research on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities and risk, and risk-based capabilities and interventions during major events

Nine partners indicated references to national research programmes that served as a basis for the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities.

They indicated references to 100 national research programmes that had supported the **assessment of threats, risks or vulnerabilities** (questions 19-46) in the identified security plans: 84 internal police research programmes (84%); 10 research programmes by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institutions (10%); and 6 studies by independent external bodies/academics used by the police (6%).

Most of the national research programmes that were used in the assessment of the different threats at major events were internal police studies. As shown in tables 8-13, within police organisations there were networks of information exchange that supported the production of national research programmes. In particular, the consultation of internal database, information exchange with other intelligence agencies and internal consultation meetings suggested coordination procedures were often used by Partners.

Table 8. Type of internal police research into public order by category of major event

Internal police research/ Public order	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Events	Major football events	High Level Summits	Social or Political Protests/ Demonstrations	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	1	3	3	1	3	2	13
Research based on consultation of existing internal databases	1	2	2	-	2	3	10
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	1	3	4	1	2	1	12
Proceedings of conferences and/or workshops organised by a project partner	-	-	2	-	1	-	3
Training material	1	-	1	-	-	2	4
Reports	1	-	2	-	1	2	6

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q24/Q9)

Table 9. Type of internal police research into terrorist threats by category of major event

Internal police research/ Terrorist threats	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Major Football Events	High Level Summits	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	1	3	3	2	10
Research based on consultation of existing internal databases	1	2	3	2	9
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	1	2	4	2	13
Proceedings of conferences and/or workshops organised by a project partner	-	1	-	-	1
Training material	1	1	-	1	3
Reports	1	2	1	2	7

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q29/Q9)

Table 10. Type of internal police research into public safety by category of major event

Internal police research/ Public safety	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Major football events	High Level Summits	Social or Political Protests / Demonstrations	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events and Celebrations	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	1	3	1	3	4	15
Research based on consultation of existing internal databases	1	1	2	3	2	9
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	1	3	1	2	2	13
Proceedings of conferences and/or workshops organised by a project partner	-	1	-	-	-	1
Training material	1	1	-	-	1	3
Reports	1	2	-	1	1	5

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q19/Q9)

Table 11. Type of internal police research into violent unauthorised demonstrations by category of major event

Internal police research/ Violent unauthorised demonstrations	Major football events	High Level Summits	Social or Political Protests /	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	-	3	1	1	-	5
Research based on consultation of existing internal databases	-	2	-	1	1	4
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies		4	1	-	-	5
Training material	-	1	-	-	-	1
Reports	1	2	-		1	4

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q39/Q9)

Table 12. Type of internal police research into criminality and delinquency by category of major event

Internal police research/ Criminality and delinquency threats	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting	Major football events	High Level Summits	Social or Political Protests/ Demonstrations	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	1	1	2	1	2	1	8
Research based on consultation of existing internal databases	1	1	1	-	2	2	7
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	1	2	2	1	2	1	9
Proceedings of conferences and/or workshops organised by a project partner	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Training material	1	-	1	-	-	1	3
Reports	1	-	2	-	-	2	5

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q34/Q9)

Table 13. Type of internal police research into threat of other events potentially embarrassing to authorities by category of major event

Internal police research/ Other events potentially embarrassing to authorities	Major football events	High Level Summits	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	-	2	1	3
Research based on consultation of existing internal databases	-	1	1	2
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	-	2	-	2
Training material		1	-	1
Reports	1	2	1	4

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q44/Q9)

In the question related to ‘**vulnerabilities** identified in the Security Plan(s) by nature of threat and on the basis of the analysis’ (question 47), the countries provided 93 indications of internal police research; 11 of research by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institutions; and 5 of research by independent external bodies/academics used by the police.

The countries also provided references to national research programmes on **intervention policies** including policing techniques (mentioned in 84% of the 31 major events identified), crowd management and control (81%), accreditation/vetting procedures (68%), public information (65%), border controls (55%), media management (48%), alcohol (39%), ticketing (26%), and others (3%).

Most of the national research programmes on intervention policies were carried out by the police with the exception of three studies conducted by non-police organisations. However, as Table 14 shows, the proportion of cases in which research programmes were not mentioned was 38% for the three most adopted intervention policies (policing techniques, crowd management and control, and accreditation/vetting procedures).

In the 15 major events in which intervention policies were based upon internal police research, there were security plans or related documents (12), consultation of existing internal databases (9), reports (6) and information exchange with other intelligence agencies (5), as indicated in Table 15.

Table 14. Intervention policies and basis for analysis (%)

Intervention policies/techniques	Yes (N= 31)	Internal Police Research	Research by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institution	Research by independent external bodies/academics used by the police
Policing techniques (N= 26)	84	62	-	-
Crowd management and control (N= 25)	81	60	4	-
Alcohol policies (N= 12)	39	25	-	-
Accreditation/vetting procedures (N= 21)	68	62	5	-
Ticketing policies (N= 8)	26	38	-	-
Border controls (N= 17)	55	41	-	-
Media management (N= 15)	48	33	7	-
Public information (N= 20)	65	40	-	-
Others (N=1)	3	100	-	-

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q62)

Table 15. Type of internal police research into intervention policies and techniques by category of major event

Internal police research Intervention policies and techniques	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Events	Football Major Events	High Level Summits	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	1	2	3	2	4	12
Research based on consultation with existing internal databases	1	1	3	2	2	9
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	1	1	2	-	1	5
Training material	1		1	-	1	3
Reports	1	1	2	-	2	6
Total	1	3	5	2	4	15

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q63/Q9)

The questionnaire also indicated 23 references to research programmes on **crowd management techniques and policies** (questions 81-84) (cf. Table 16). This was all internal police research, apart from two cases of research by external bodies or academics requested by governmental institutions, and one of research carried out by independent external bodies or academics used by the police (cf. Table 14). The types of internal police research most mentioned were security plans or preparatory material (68%), and consultation of existing internal databases (42%), as can be seen in Table 17.

Table 16. Research programmes on crowd management techniques and policies during crisis situations by category of major event

Research Programmes on Crowd Management Techniques and Policies	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Football Major Events	High Level Summits	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total	
Internal Police Research	1	5	6	4	4	20
Research by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institutions		1		1		2
Research by independent external bodies/academics used by the police				1		1
Total	N=1	N=5	N=6	N=4	N=4	N=20

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q81/Q9)

Table 17. Type of internal police research into crowd management techniques and policies during crisis situations by category of major event

Internal Police Research on Crowd Management Techniques and Policies	Responses	(%)
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	13	68
Research based on consultation with existing internal databases	8	42
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	7	37
Training material	4	21
Reports	7	37
N/A = 1	N=19	

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q82)

Moreover countries indicated 16 research programmes on **media policies** (questions 86-88). Twelve of the cases specified that the research was carried out internally by the police; 4 cases by independent external bodies or academics and then used by the police, and one case by external bodies or academics requested by a governmental institution (see Table 18).

Table 18. Research programmes on dialogue and use of media policies during crisis situations by category of major event

National Research Programmes on Media Policies	Olympics or Other Comparable Sporting Events	Football Major Events	High Level Summits	Large-scale Cultural Events	Major Religious Events or Celebrations	Total
Internal Police Research	1	2	4	2	3	12
Research by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institutions				1		1
Research by independent external bodies/ academics used by the police		1	1		2	4

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q85/Q9)

Security plans or preparatory material or reports (in both cases with 58%) and research based upon exchange with other intelligence agencies (42%) were the most mentioned types of internal police research, as can be seen in Table 19.

Table 19. Type of internal police research on dialogue and use of media policies during crisis situations

Internal Police Research on Media Policies	Responses	(%)
Documented security plans and related preparatory material	7	58
Research based on consultation with existing internal databases	4	33
Research based on information exchange with other intelligence agencies	5	42
Training material	3	25
Reports	7	58
	N= 12	

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q86)

Finally, countries provided references to 22 national programmes on **intelligence cooperation**: 17 cases of internal police research, 3 of research by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institutions, and 2 of research by independent external bodies/academics used by the police (questions 58-60).

2.4 Conclusions

According to the Portuguese experts, the questionnaire did not capture all required information for two main reasons. The first was that some methodological problems affected the quality and quantity of the answers.¹⁴ As the Police College of Finland (SM PO) pointed out, most of the partners who ticked the 'yes' box indicating the existence of national research programmes, did not provide any detailed references such as title, author, date and abstract. By the count of the original responses provided by the partners, 682 security issues were identified throughout the entire sample of 29 events for 11 countries. 73% of these were said to be included in research (64% being internal police research, 7% being external commissioned research and the remaining 2% being independent research) but the respondents were able to offer research citations in only about 21% of them. Even then, the cited research was of such varying quality, detail and accessibility, that it was not possible to explore it in a very meaningful way.

The second problem was that the questionnaires did not include definitions of all the technical terminology, including central concepts such as threat, risk, vulnerability and capability, public order vs. public safety, etc. As a result, part of the data collection process suffered from misunderstandings and/or misconceptions regarding the meaning of some questions and lack of uniformity and consistency of data.

In view of these difficulties, the Portuguese GCS/MAI concluded that the EU-SEC Questionnaire was not always properly completed (especially in the section related to the national research programmes on risk-based capabilities and interventions). Therefore, the results cannot be considered conclusive.

Having said that, the data collected from Portugal provided a truly state of the art picture of the research programmes on security during major events in the EU-SEC countries. It contained specific information related to main major events, centres of research, general bibliography, security plans, and post-event reports. Moreover the questionnaire captured many references to national research programmes that served as a basis for the production of the security plans.

There are important findings from the Portuguese analysis. The first is that the gathered data only represents the respective police organisation's own internal universe of knowledge on the security of major events. The questionnaire's answers clearly indicated that the references to national research programmes were mostly related to 'internal police research' and were only sporadically related to 'research by external bodies/academics requested by governmental institution' and 'research by independent external bodies/academics used by the police'. This finding may suggest the idea that police security planners believed that independent research with no operational relationship to the field could really yield results of any practical use. Therefore, non-police views on security at major events was not incorporated into a regular cycle of police research and evaluation.

The second finding is that the police interpreted and used the term 'research' as 'operational research' instead of 'developmental research'. This means that the 'research' was seen as the *preparation* work and security measures for specific major events more than a scientific process of research on topics relating to major event security more generally. In other words, 'research

¹⁴ Portuguese experts suggested to set up appropriate *ad hoc* multidisciplinary structures at the national level, with skilled human resources able to respond to the requirements of questionnaires like the EU-SEC one. Also proposed was the organisation of bilateral meetings with each Partner in order to clarify underlying criteria and standardize the information collected.

programme' seems to be the tacit 'hand me down' knowledge that comes from an ongoing cycle of debriefings, reflections and evaluations for successive events.

The third is that, at internal police level, there are networks of information exchange that support the research processes. Thus, activities such as consultation of internal databases, information exchange with other agencies or internal consultation meetings guarantee a certain level of coordination and exchange of information during the production of threat assessments, preventive measures researches and other research activities that inform security plans.

These conclusions complete the task of this second chapter: to produce a state-of-the-art survey. Yet, the questionnaire also captured data on more analytical aspects such as strengths, weaknesses and gaps of research programmes on security of major events. The description of these results is the goal of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Analysis of the national research programmes

As has been seen, the Portuguese GCS/MAI, with the support of UNICRI and SM PO, designed the EU-SEC questionnaire intended to capture detailed information about 31 major events that the EU-SEC Partners hosted between 1998 and 2005¹⁵. The previous chapter offered a statistical survey of the existing national research programmes on security during major events. This new chapter further explores the data collected with the aim to identify gaps and complementarities in the research programmes. In particular, seven points are elaborated on: lack of non-police research; risk analysis and threat assessment; research on preventive measures; strengths and good practice; weaknesses and gaps; knowledge to be transferred and need for research programmes. This chapter is based on the analysis of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Interior of Portugal (GCS/MAI).

3.1 Lack of non-police research

As has been seen in the previous chapter, most of the ‘national research programmes’ used as a reference for the preparation of security plans consisted of internal police research, particularly reports of past events, lesson reports, security checklists, officially instituted safety regulations, national legislation and research carried out by specialist departments. Moreover, most of the centres producing knowledge were integrated into police organisations and only a few existed as independent organizations.

As a result, a first point of reflection is to ask how self critical authorities are prepared to be. How objective can evaluations from police research be? Do they actively seek the views of the organisers, non police support staff, participants and others involved in or affected by the event?

3.2 Threats and vulnerabilities

The EU-SEC questionnaire offered substantial and helpful amount of information. An important indication provided by the Partners came from the questions concerning ‘threats, vulnerabilities or risks identified in the security plans’ (questions 17, 22, 27, 32, 37 and 42), ‘vulnerabilities identified in the security plans’ (question 47) and ‘level of risks identified in the security plans’ (question 48). In all these questions the EU-SEC questionnaire indicated six different areas where threats could occur: public order, public safety, criminality and delinquency, terrorism, violent unauthorised demonstrations and other events potentially embarrassing to authorities.


As shown in Figure 1, *public order* and *public safety* were the most mentioned threats by the security plans of the 31 major events under analysis (both with 97%), followed by *criminality and delinquency* (74%) and *terrorist threats* (71%).¹⁶ *Violent unauthorised demonstrations* (42%), and *other events potentially embarrassing to authorities* (35%) were less frequently cited. The columns

¹⁵ In addition to the 30 major events hosted by the EU-SEC Partners, Belgium offered information about UEFA EURO 2000, since this event was co-organized by Belgium and The Netherlands together.

¹⁶ In answering to these questions, the EU-SEC partners could select six different predefined categories: public safety, public order, terrorist threats, criminality and delinquency, violent unauthorised demonstrations, and other events potentially embarrassing to the authorities.

of Table 1 also show which sub-categories were indicated per each threat. For example, the most selected sub-category of *threat to public order* were *traffic management* (indicated in 93% of the answers), *crowd behaviour* (90%), etc.

Figure 1



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q17, Q22, Q27, Q32, Q37, Q42, Q47)

Table 1. Types of terrorist threats and basis for the assessment

Threats to public order	Threats to public safety	Criminality and delinquency threats	Terrorist Threats	Violent unauthorised demonstrations	Threat of other events potentially embarrassing to authorities
Crowd behaviour (90%)	Crowd behaviour (90%)	Theft/robbery (83%)	Suicide attacks, bomb explosions, etc. (100%)	Radical political activism (69%)	Strikes (64%)
Traffic management (93%)	Event-related disasters such as fires at the venues (50%)	Riots (70%)	CBRN terrorism – dirty bombs (82%)	Political manifestation (62%)	Media disclosure of flaws in security (55%)
Firearm incidents (43%)	Disasters unrelated to events but which nevertheless have an impact (23%)	Assaults (65%)	Conventional terrorist hostage-taking, kidnapping (77%)	Social political unrest (62%)	Others (27%)

Football hooliganism (23%)	Public health (47%)	Counterfeits (52%)	Traditional and or Islamic- inspired terrorism (86%)	Others (8%)	
Fights (43%)	Others (17%)	Sabotage (43%)	Bomb threats (95%)		
Assault (23%)		Money forgery (35%)	Others (14%)		
Vandalism (67%)		Drug-related crime (30%)			
NBCR (13%)		Vehicle-related crime (22%)			
Others (13%)		Others (17%)			


Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q17, Q18, Q22, Q23, Q27, Q28, Q37, Q38, Q42, Q43)

The EU-SEC Partners identified vulnerabilities most precisely in the areas of *public order* (97%), *public safety* (87%), *criminality and delinquency* (68%), *violent unauthorised demonstrations* (52%) and *terrorist threats* (48%).

As for the question concerning the risks identified in the security plans (question 48), the EU-SEC Partners could indicate five different levels of risks (critical, high, medium, low and negligible) per each of the six areas of threats already mentioned. As shown in Figure 2, the result was that *terrorist threat* received the highest score (16%) at the ‘critical’ level, followed by *violent unauthorised demonstrations* (12%), *criminality and delinquency* (5%) and *events potentially embarrassing to authorities* (5%). Most of the cases above the level of ‘medium’ (high and critical) concerned risks related to *public order* (59%), followed by *terrorism* (48%) and *public safety* (34%). Most of the cases below the level of ‘medium’ (low and negligible) concerned risks related to *events potentially embarrassing to authorities* (72%), *criminality and delinquency* (63%) and *violent unauthorised demonstrations* (54%).

As has been said in chapter one, most of the answers did not provide detailed references to national research programmes that inform threat and vulnerability assessments. Therefore, another point of reflection is to ask how accurate threat assessments are in relation to the reality of threats they purport to represent.

Figure 2



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q48)

3.3 Preventive measures research

According to the findings of the EU-SEC Questionnaire (question 96), *policing techniques*, *crowd management and control*, and *accreditation and vetting procedures* were the most common intervention policies considered by the national research programmes (cf. Table 2).

Table 2. Intervention policies and basis for analysis (%)

Intervention policies/techniques	Policing techniques	Crowd management and control	Alcohol policies	Accreditation/vetting procedures	Ticketing policies	Border controls	Media management	Public information	Others
(%)	84 %	81 %	39 %	68 %	26 %	55 %	48 %	65%	3%

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire Part B (Q62)

As in the previous case, most of the answers did not provide detailed information on most of these intervention policies. In particular, there are three areas where research gaps seem to exist: identification of threats to public order; crowd management techniques and policies; and media management.

Quite remarkably, information available suggests that media management has not been the object of special research by police forces. Where it exists, it is mainly supportive of crisis management interventions and most of the research underlying it, continues to be internal to the police. Though

used by some as a form of mediation and purposeful deterrence, media is mostly used currently for the provision of information about security and safety measures and to encouraging confidence in a major event.

3.4 Strengths and good practice

The EU-SEC Partners provided other important indications by answering the question on strengths and weaknesses in security evaluation (question 96) and the question on good practices identified (question 102). As shown in Table 3, the strengths most frequently referred to by the officers in operational charge of security during the major events, were the *policing model adopted*, the *leadership structure in command*, and *compliance with the plan/early start preparation*.

Table 3. Strengths in security evaluation

Strengths	Responses	(%)
Policing model adopted	17	65
Leadership structure in command	15	58
Compliance with the plan/early start preparation	14	54
Vetting procedures/accreditation	11	42
Sharing of information: intelligence centre	10	38
Cooperation with foreign security forces	9	35
Information and media management	9	35
Protection of VIP's and dignitaries	9	35
Crowd management	9	35
Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institutions	7	27
Policing techniques	6	23
Threat and vulnerability assessment	5	19
Police training	5	19
Modern technology equipment used	3	12
Others	8	31
N / A = 5 (16%)	N= 26 (84%)	
Total = 31		

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q.96.11)

Table 4 shows the strengths divided by different categories of major event. In the case of the high level summits, the second most referred strength was *protection of VIPs and dignitaries* (75%), while *leadership structure in command* and *vetting procedures/accreditation* came joint third (63%)¹⁷. The latter was one of the most indicated strengths in the case of major religious events or celebrations (100%). In major football events, *compliance with the plan/early start preparation* was the most referred strength (83%), followed by *cooperation with foreign security forces* (67%) and *policing model adopted* (50%).

¹⁷ In high level summits, the most referred strength was also 'policing model adopted', involving 88% of cases.

Table 4. Strengths in security evaluation by category of major event

Category of Major Event	Strengths
Olympics or other major comparable sporting events	Sharing of information/intelligence centre (100%) Policing model adopted (100%) Leadership structure in command (100%) Vetting procedures/accreditation (100%)
Major football events	Compliance with the plan/ early start preparation (83%) Cooperation with foreign security forces (67%) Policing model adopted (50%)
High level summits	Policing model adopted (88%) Protection of VIP's and dignitaries (75%) Leadership structure in command (63%) Vetting procedures/accreditation (63%)
Social or political protests/ demonstrations	Leadership structure in command (100%) Compliance with the plan/early start preparation (50%) Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institutions (50%) Information and media management (50%)
Large-scale cultural events	Leadership structure in command (100%) Policing model adopted (50%) Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institutions (50%) Police training (50%) Crowd management (50%)
Major religious events or celebrations	Vetting procedures/accreditation (100%) Policing model adopted (75%) Compliance with the plan/early start preparation (75%)

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q9/Q.96.11)

Moving on good practice (question 102), the EU-SEC Partners chose mostly the *sharing of information/ intelligence centre* (68%), followed by *policing model adopted* (59%) and *leadership structure in command* (55%) (see Table 5) as good practice¹⁸. As has been seen, the last two topics were also identified as the main strengths (cf. Table 3).

Table 5. Good practice as regards security measures during the major events

Good Practises	Responses	(%)
Sharing of information/intelligence centre	15	68
Policing model adopted	13	59
Leadership structure in command	12	55

¹⁸ The analysis was based upon 22 of the 31 questionnaires (71%), since 9 (29%) did not respond to question 102 of the EU-SEC Questionnaire.

Information and media management	11	50
Vetting procedures/accreditation	9	41
Cooperation with foreign security forces	7	32
Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institution	7	32
Compliance with the plan/early start preparation	6	27
Protection of VIP's and dignitaries	6	27
Policing techniques	5	23
Crowd management	5	23
Threat and vulnerability assessment	4	18
Police training	4	18
Modern technology equipment used	3	14
Others	5	23
N/A= 9 (29%)	N= 22 (71%)	
Total = 31		

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q102)

In addition, the EU-SEC Partners indicated good practice for six different categories of major events: Olympics or other major comparable sporting events, major football events, high-level summit, social or political protests/demonstrations, large-scale cultural events, and major religious events/celebrations. As shown in Table 6, *vetting procedures/accreditation* was indicated as the principal good practice in security of the Olympics or other major comparable sporting events, as well as in the security of major religious events or celebrations (100% in both cases). The most mentioned good practices in security of major football events were *sharing of information/intelligence centre*, *compliance with the plan/early preparation*, *cooperation with foreign security forces*, and *information and media management* (all with 60%). The latter was the principal good practice in security of social or political protests/demonstrations (100%).

Table 6. Good practices as regards security measures by category of major event

Category of Major Event	Good practices
Olympics or other major comparable sporting events	Sharing of information/intelligence centre (100%) Leadership structure in command (100%) Vetting procedures/accreditation (100%)
Major football events	Compliance with the plan/early start preparation (60%) Sharing of information/intelligence centre (60%) Cooperation with foreign security forces (60%) Information and media management (60%)
High level summits	Sharing of information/intelligence centre (75%) Policing model adopted (75%) Leadership structure in command (75%)
Social or political protests/	Information and media management (100%) Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institution (60%)

demonstrations	Compliance with the plan/early start preparation (60%)
Large-scale cultural events	Sharing of information/intelligence centre (100%) Policing model adopted (100%) Leadership structure in command (67%) Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institution (67%) Police training (67%)
Major religious events or celebrations	Vetting procedures/accreditation (100%) Leadership structure in command (67%) Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institution (67%) Information and media management (67%)

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q9/Q102)

A comparison of the main strengths and good practice helps identify the areas where the national security authorities focus more attention. As shown in Table 7, the most selected security measures were the *police command structure*, the *sharing and management of information in intelligence centres*, including cooperation with foreign security forces, the *police model adopted*, and the *vetting procedures/accreditation*.

Table 7. Main strengths/good practises as regards security measures by category of major event

Category of Major Event	Strengths/Good Practices
In general	Leadership structure in command Sharing of information/intelligence centre Policing model adopted Information and media management Vetting procedures/accreditation Cooperation with foreign security forces
Olympics or other major comparable sporting events	Sharing of information/intelligence centre Leadership structure in command Vetting procedures/accreditation
Major football events	Compliance with the plan/early start preparation Cooperation with foreign security forces
High level summits	Policing model adopted Leadership structure in command
Social or political protest/demonstrations	Information and media management
Large-scale cultural events	Sharing of information/intelligence centre Policing model adopted Leadership structure in command Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institution Police training
Major religious events or celebrations	Vetting procedures/accreditation

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q9/Q96.11 & Q102)

3.5 Weaknesses and gaps

Along with strengths and good practice, the EU-SEC questionnaire attempted to capture information on weaknesses in the security measures adopted during major events (question 96). Unfortunately, most of the EU-SEC Partners did not indicate any weaknesses in the security measures adopted and the few data collected were not heterogeneous. The only aspect that attracted consensus was *planning and implementation*.

The partners were not meticulous in identifying security areas that required more attention in the implementation of plans during major events (question 103). Out of the 31 major events selected, there were only 16 feedbacks, three of which did not mention any aspect in particular. Of the remaining 13, despite the great heterogeneity of responses, the aspects most indicated as deserving greater attention were the *leadership structure in command*, *compliance with the plan* and *better use of new technology*.

The questionnaire also aimed to identify the security measures that needed to be more researched during the planning phase (question 104). Once again, the data collection was partial and covered only 7 of the 31 major events. In four of these cases, the EU-SEC Partners suggested that *better management of information* was an area in which research gaps existed.


Based on the information collected on both the strengths/ good practice, and the weaknesses/gaps identified, it is possible to conclude that the main security subjects during major events centre on the *organization of the command structure* and the *collection and management of information*, both in the planning phase and the implementation phase. *Vetting procedures* and the *use of IT resources* were also important matters during the implementation phase.

3.6 Transferable knowledge

Question 105 asked country experts what knowledge acquired during the organisation of a major event could be transferred to other partners. As in the previous case, the data collected were not exhaustive and covered only 16 of the 31 major events selected.

As can be seen in Figure 3, the *policing model adopted* (75%), the *cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institutions* (63%), the *information and media management* (63%) and the *leadership structure in command* (56%) were the most frequently mentioned areas in which knowledge was transferred during the organisation of the selected major events.

Figure 3



Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q105)

Table 8 groups together the countries that transferred knowledge on different subjects. Although not exhaustive, this table is a preliminary attempt to identify existing networks between countries.

Table 8. Main issues of transferable knowledge acquired by country

Knowledge matters to be transferred	Country
Policing model adopted	Austria, France, Ireland, Portugal
Cooperation with the organizer, private security and other institution	Austria, Ireland, Portugal
Information and media management	Austria, France, Ireland
Leadership structure in command	Austria, France, Germany, Portugal
Police training	Portugal
Vetting procedures/accreditation	United Kingdom
Crowd management	Portugal

Source: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q1/Q105)

3.7 Needs for research programmes

The EU-SEC Questionnaire also captured data on new issues that should be researched (question 6) and issues that have been already studied but should be further developed (question 5).

A general preliminary obserbvation from this data is that the EU-SEC Partners agreed that the existing national research programmes need to be improved. This emphasises the pertinence and appropriateness of the EU-SEC Project, given that it establishes a platform for coordinating national research programmes on security during major events.

As can be seen in Table 9, the data collected suggested that:

- the areas requiring further investigation were *knowledge from former events* and *police organization and methods*;
- the new areas that required investigation included the *assessment of terrorist threats*, *police techniques and training*, and *crowd management*. As previously shown in Figure 2, these subjects made up to the highest risks in the security plans of the major events selected;
- other areas identified as requiring further research, especially a deepening of already existing knowledge, were the *gathering and management of information* and *cooperation between public services and private security*.

Table 9. Suggestions for research into security during major events in general by country

Research issues	Deepen areas already studied	New areas	Total
Knowledge from former events	4	4	8
Police organization and methods	4	4	8
Assessment of terrorist threat	2	4	6
Police techniques and training	2	3	5
Crowd management	3	2	5
Gathering and management of information	4	1	5
Cooperation between public services and private security	4	1	5
Police resources or capacity	2	2	4
International intelligence co-operation	2	2	4
Establishment of a best policing practical manual	1	3	4
The influence of mass media on security during the event	1	2	3
Assessment of public safety threats	2	1	3
Assessment of public order threats	2	1	3
Risk sub-cultures related to major events	2	1	3
Protection officers tolerance of pressures and stress	3	-	3
Identification/detection of arms and explosives or non metallic weapons	1	1	2
Public confidence in security authorities	1	1	2
Others	4	3	7
N/A	1	2	-
Total the countries in analysis = 11	N=10 (91%)	N= 9 (82%)	N=11 (100%)

Fonte: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part A (Q5 & Q6)

In addition, as can be seen in Table 10, the EU-SEC Partners pointed out issues that, ‘according to the evaluation of security measures adopted’, should be more researched (question 97). The greatest consensus about new areas that needed to be researched concerned *terrorism* (particularly at high

level summits, large-scale cultural events and major football events), *police organization and techniques* and *international intelligence co-operation*.

Among the various suggestions about new areas for research or areas deserving further study, the main gaps include *terrorist threats*, *public order* and *police techniques*.

Table 10. Suggestions of new areas of research into security during major events

Research issues	Responses	(%)
Identification/detection of arms and explosives or non metallic weapons	6	43
Assessment of terrorist threat	4	29
Police techniques and training	4	29
International intelligence co-operation	3	21
Establishment of a best policing practical manual	3	21
Police organization and methods	3	21
Knowledge from former events	2	14
Protection officers tolerance of pressures and stress	2	14
Police resources or capacity	2	14
Gathering and management of information	1	7
Effective use of CCTV and other IT equipment	1	7
Public confidence in security authorities	1	7
The influence of mass media on security during the event	1	7
Others	6	43

Fonte: EU-SEC Questionnaire - Part B (Q97)

Chapter 4

Proposals for Future Research Activities

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first is to identify a number of main thematic areas that, according to the EU-SEC Partners, should be included in or further studied by the national research programmes on major event security. The second is to suggest some practical proposals to address some of the identified themes through joint programme activities. The chapter is based on the work of the Police College (SM PO) of the Ministry of the Interior of Finland.¹⁹

4.1 Thematic areas for future programmes of developmental research

Based on the data collected through the EU-SEC questionnaire, it is possible to identify 10 main thematic areas in which the EU-SEC Partners signalled topics that deserve further study and new topics that need to be researched. The findings are contained in the following table.

Thematic areas	Current research concern	Future research concern
1) Legality & Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> clarity over legal responsibility for the provision of security during major events²⁰; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> responsibilities and liabilities of police and other partners; clearer rules established on partnership and cooperation in respect of control duties, joint inspections and cooperation with organisers; clarity given regarding minimum legal conditions and concepts relating to the various forms of 'plans' required; the proper classification of 'major event' defined; the legal and ethical basis on the use of ultimate force; the employment and use of the military in civil matters; problems of military police taking orders from civil police.
2) Plans & Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> best practice for security planning; reviewing of existing plans; adequacy of routinely using previous plans for regular events; early integration of police with organizers during planning stages to ensure necessary information flows 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> defining the characteristics of the operational plan and threat assessment structure; developing a global checklist for organising major event security; pre-event preparation exercises; contingencies for adverse weather.

¹⁹ SM PO was the leader of the task 2.1 *Exploring Complementarities and Gaps in Existing National Research Programmes*.

²⁰ This topics was signalled by the EU-SEC Partners during the kick-off meeting that took place in Turin in December 2004.

	and effective progress of police responsibilities.	
3) Venues, Vetting & VIPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the process of approving security plans and conducting site security reviews²¹; escort and movement of VIPs at major events²²; the ability to cope with large crowds when small villages host or are affected by major events. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the suitability of spectator venues; researching the best way to chose event venues; developing an agreed inter-European standard of badging; developing an international vetting system; developing vetting procedures, in particular, the security vetting of existing staff; the earlier identification of intruders and infiltrators; the use of the internet in searching for and identifying troublemakers and the active testing of security measures.
4) Resources & Capacities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> capacity of existing resources to handle security at major events; resource availability in general and their coordination; formation and training of personnel; the ability to cope with large crowds when small villages host large events; the development of methods of mass detainment such as crowd containment, mass arrests & detention, and holding centres; psychosocial post-operative treatment; critical incident debriefings/post traumatic stress disorders; ability of officers to handle operational pressure/stress. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the need to limit the size of escorts; purchase and retention of specialist equipment such as armoured VIP vehicles; organiser's absorption of the cost of security provision and the manner in which costs are transferred between the national authority and event organiser; the suitability of police personnel carriers; demand for interpreters outstripping supply.
5) Internal & External Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the need for interdisciplinary coordination; cooperation between partners involved in security operations; public sector collaboration with bodies responsible for various security tasks; private sector collaboration over roles and use of private security companies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> cooperation between organizations and public services in general; early involvement in planning and preparation as important; cooperation with non-police bodies; occupational cultures and differences in police/partner attitudes; clarity and distinction of competencies for tactical sections; joint training for different departments & support police and private security cooperation, including extent to which the police cover private security resource short falls and the

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> professionalism of private security; the police primacy over security in contrast to private organisation.
6) International Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the need for more fluent and less bureaucratic cooperation with Europol; the need to improve the system of affording priority status recognition for countries hosting major events. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a need for a system of agreed recognition by Europol of host countries as a priority when hosting major events and cooperation between countries with large resources and scarce resources needs to be improved; multinational support missions; early involvement in foreign agencies; international cooperation on evaluation; international police cooperation in street policing; the development of an international best police practices standard regarding personal protection officers.
7) Public Order Policing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> mass phenomena such as mass hysteria and crowd behaviour (DE); social causes of hooliganism and the development of crowd control tactics that ensure safety (FI) the extent to which political activists really exist as 'professional protesters' (Belgium) spatial traffic management (DE). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> crowd behaviour; the impact of alcohol sales/consumption; a joint EU police public order field exercise via CEPOL; better missing/lost persons procedures; the closure of Metro Stations as a crowd management problem; traffic congestion and control at site entrance and site & car parking directions.
8) Media & Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> coordination of event arrangements (DE, IT, PT) and operational control at them (UK)²³; the communication of information and its efficiency (DE, IT); the importance of requiring a unique command and clarity of line in that command and capacity to mediate (IT) the mass media and its effective use at major events as a communications tool for security (FI) the public's confidence in the authority's ability to provide security and respond to breaches in it (FI). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the improvement of internal and external communication routes; the development of common security practices/procedures concerning communication; the improvement of communication to spectators; the media handling of security incidents; developing police liaison with organizers and activist groups; the use of a single contact point; the management of command and control information; the need to start early for communications and data exchange IT systems; methods and experiences of information sharing;

²³ Ibid.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the development of a seamless boarder to venue coordination of services as a means of communication.
9) Terrorism & Threat Assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developing explosive detection technology (UK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> new forms of terrorist threats; explosive detection technology and peroxide explosive detection methods; terrorist profiling and recognition; tactics in relation to terrorist threats (firearms, ultimate force, legal basis, ethical problems); non metallic weapons detection; the effective dealing with suicide bombers at large public events; the testing and development of ability to identify terrorists/attacks; effective use and storage of CCTV systems.
10) Establishing Research Activity		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> develop a common research programme in relation to security at major events; a consolidation and sharing of existing research and established best practices/best police practices; knowledge/best practices from past events; comparative studies on similar events via CEPOL seminars .

In addition to the questionnaire, the EU-SEC meetings were excellent opportunities for the EU-SEC Partners to further discuss topics suitable for new or further exploration²⁴. As a result, four other thematic areas and a number of research concerns were raised. All material is reported in the following table.

Thematic areas	Research concern
1) Technology Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What technologies are countries developing? What technologies are different departments or governmental entities using and which ones are they looking to develop? What private companies operate in the field and what technology related products are they offering? Are there many similarities in the technology priorities of different countries? Do certain countries already have technology solutions that others are seeking? Which country uses what technology? Which technology is good? Which can be improved? Where can money be saved? Which technology/ or what information regarding technology is not suitable to exchange?

²⁴ Particular helpful was the meeting of the EU-SEC Steering Committee that took place in Dublin in December 2005. The meeting was co-chaired by Portugal and Finland and attended by Europol, France, Spain, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and UNICRI.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How can technology be used/bought to facilitate international cooperation?
2) Private Security (role and use of)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the use of private security increasing? If so, what policing functions are they involved with? What are the ramifications? • What has been the role of private security in recent events (such as the Helsinki World Athletic Championships for instance). Is this set to continue? What was the impact of this involvement? • Should some of the profits generated by Major Events be used to employ private companies? • What are the competing interests between the private and public sector in the provision of security during major events? • What are some of the limitations or benefits of using private security companies?
3) Evaluation and Information sharing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How can best practices be transferred? • How is information currently being exchanged? • What is the most efficient way of sharing information? What channels can be set up? What measures can be taken? • What information sharing methodologies exist? How can these be improved? • What are some of the pitfalls in adopting this methodology?
4) Media Management (role and use of)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How should media be managed? What can be done to improve this? • How can the media be involved in promoting efficient communication to spectators, missing/lost persons, the public at large, crowd management etc? • What is the partnership role between media and event organisers? • How can the media be involved in ensuring public confidence? What can be done to improve public cooperation at a major event and promote a good police image during it?

4.2 Elaboration of proposals

Based on these lists of thematic areas and specific issues, the Police College of Finland has suggested eight proposals to encourage future joint activities. The EU-SEC Partners welcomed all proposals and considered five of them particularly suitable for future exploration:

- 1) A Common Pool of Available Specialist Technical Equipment (STEP)
- 2) A Common Register of Major Events in Europe (EMER)
- 3) A European Register of Vetted Events Staff (EVES)
- 4) A Rolling Integrity Testing & Evaluation Survey (RITES)
- 5) Field Test the IPO Toolkit

4.2.1 STEP

The first idea was a **Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP)**, a common pool of specialist technological equipment that could be made available by cooperating partners for assistance to countries hosting major events.

Ideally, STEP should assist countries that are planning for major events and seeking international assistance to perform the following tasks:

- identifying rare, expensive and highly specialist technical equipment;
- receiving operational ‘reviews’ of the new specialist equipment being promoted by sales companies as field-tested by various authorities/security planners. With so much equipment on the market (and increasingly more likely to be so), quick access to professional peer group opinion when considering purchases would be of value.

Drawing on the EMER database (see below), STEP was envisaged to be:

- **Secure:** Data detailing the operational limits of a national authority’s technology, in terms of security provision at major events or otherwise, is understandably sensitive. Such data could not only be exploited by people with bad intentions, it could also be commercially exploited against a strategic interest in national, or at least European, industrial supply.
- **Selective:** The idea was not to create an inventory of *all* specialist technical equipment owned by a national authority. To serve the planning function, core items to include should be those the contributing national authority has available for loan (in the name of international cooperation/assistance) to other national authorities within the EU. To serve the procurement function, items not available for loan to others but used in security planning/provision internally could also be listed. Both would have field operation reviews.
- **Easily searchable:** STEP would have to be electronic and web-based. It would have to be accessible to authorised users acting for EU member states’ national authorities responsible for major event security planning. It should also be searchable by equipment category, type, make and model (at least). It would also have to be operated and contributed to in English as a common working language.

EUROPOL, UNICRI (via IPO) or an EU national authority’s representative under the auspices of CEPOL could play the role of the central administrative body that manages STEP. The host would have responsibility for setting up and servicing STEP, including its promotion and the gathering of national authorities’ contributions.

Set up of STEP would require the identification and installation of a suitable and secure programme and the structuring of the initial data inputting from contributing partners. For its maintenance, contributing partners should have control over their own data and should be able to input, amend and remove their own data as they see fit. Maintenance of up to date information would be the responsibility of the individual contributing authority.

Envisaged basic data entry fields would include (and be searchable and accessible by):

Country (drop file of EU member states): National Authority (for major event security): National Contact Point (for liaison over international police cooperation on major event security):
Contributing organisation/department (owner of the item of equipment in question): Name of liaison officer/officer in charge (for equipment in question): Category of equipment (use common ‘catalogue’ categories from the market):
Name, make and model of item (separate fields):

Photograph/image of the item (optional but desirable): Year first purchased and cost per item (separate fields - optional): Number of items owned and departmental locations (optional):
Main operational use (drop file of categories + 'other' free text): Major event recently used at (drop file EU-SEC categories, plus name, date and venue): Field portability (e.g. hand held, desk operated, driven, fixed, restricted locations). Maintenance level (high/low)
Operational Review (Free text to cover strengths and weaknesses)

Experimental use could be made of chemical detection, identification & monitoring equipment (known as 'DIMs') in respect of bomb searching processes.

4.4.2 EMER

The second idea was to set up a **Common Register of Major Events in Europe (EMER)** through which the EU member states can register their 'Events' for formal recognition by the EU. EMER could adopt the EU-SEC definition of 'Major Events' to identify and formally recognise which event is major. As in the case of STEP, EUROPOL, UNICRI (via IPO) or an EU national authority's representative under the auspices of CEPOL could play the role of the central administrative body that manages EMER.

The hosting country could submit the following information to EMER:

- General information about the event (country, date, venue, duration of the event, event type, its formal name, and the event organiser's name and contact details.)
- Name of the national authority responsible for security during the event, the senior officer in command & control of security and the key officer responsible for planning security.
- Where known (or for later update prior to commencement date), the basic nature of potential threats and names of international organisations and authorities expected to cooperate and assist.

Through EMER, the administrative body could perform the following activities:

- Monitoring the registered major events. On a daily basis throughout the duration of the registered event, the administrative body could request (or arrange for control to automatically supply) a return of the simple data such as any incident's occurrence, number of people arrested, death toll etc. In this way, the central administrative body could identify the events that suffered significant security/safety breaches and other critical incidents.
- Collecting and disseminating key documents or reports such as security plans, threat assessments etc. for future reference and research purpose.
- Facilitating other services such as the evaluation costs in some specific areas or the researching of specialist equipment that might be available to other authorities for future events. For this purpose, EMER could contain information such as the total cost of security provision for whole event, the total cost of security provision for the national authority, the main items of specialist equipment left to authority as a result of hosting event, etc.

4.2.3 EVES

The third proposal was to create a **European Register of Vetted Event Staff (EVES)**, a database that registers vetted staff for major events across Europe. In practical terms, EVES could speed up and enrich vetting decision making processes by monitoring those individuals who regularly apply for casual work in, or professional access to, secure zones and VIPs at major events. Security planners could use EVES to check if vetting candidates from other countries have already been vetted in other European countries, to what degree and for what type of access for events.

There are obvious (but not prohibitive) data protection issues with this idea. It would be important to ensure that the data base is registered with the appropriate data protection registrar and that applicants are informed that their data will be kept on such a register.

EVES database could have huge potential as a sampling frame for regular ‘user’ feedback, comment and evaluation as to security provisions and their potential weaknesses at major events. Moreover, EVES could also be used to monitor private security agencies that are increasingly used at major events with varying degree of reliability. This may be an important knowledge base for when police have to assume command of private security resources at major events.

4.2.4 RITES

The fourth idea was a **Rolling Integrity Testing & Evaluation Survey (RITES)**. RITES would be a standard routine survey of badged and/or security vetted non-security staff/visitors for their independent views.

As in the case of STEP and EMER, EUROPOL, UNICRI (via IPO) or an EU national authority’s representative under the auspices of CEPOL could play the role of the central administrative body that manages RITES.

The simple survey/feedback form could be given out with their security badge as part of the badging administration system by the organiser/authority. The form would be pre-coded with the EMER registration number and any other pertinent detail (e.g. level of security clearance/type of security zone accessible) and be on a prepaid ‘fold up and post’ form (one page) addressed direct to the central EMER / RITES administrator. It could simply ask three questions about:

- the potential weaknesses in security at this event,
- possible measure to improve security, and
- comment about security arrangement and safety at this event

RITES could be used for different purposes:

- Organiser and the host authority could include survey data collected into their final evaluation report.
- Over time, RITES could be used to identify types of events, or the organisers of events, at which security is regularly regarded as weak by end users – even (upon further investigation) the repeated points of weakness or repeated private security companies involved. This would be useful information for security planners to be aware of and be equipped with when engaging early on with organisers – particularly if not previously cooperated with before. Similarly, it would be possible to see which host authorities are regularly noted to have weaknesses in their security arrangements that they might not otherwise be aware of.

- RITES could be used to either routinely check if access to secure zones can be gained without serious obstacles by security staff at relevant check points or to further explore specific weaknesses identified at previous events by the above evaluation survey. The findings would also form part of the immediate feedback to the event and its security.

4.2.5 Test the IPO models and other ideas

The fifth idea was to **Field Test the IPO Toolkit and the IPO Security Planning Model**. UNICRI developed the Toolkit as an instrument to assist Policymakers and Security Planners to plan security during major events. The Toolkit provides a pragmatic and sensible planning framework through the complex earlier stages of planning. The IPO planning framework could be the starting point for field-testing and assessment in which the EU-SEC Partners compare their existing security planning procedures.

In addition to these proposals, the Police College of Finland suggested three other ideas that the EU-SEC Partners welcomed, but considered less suitable for future cooperation. The first was a **Threat Assessment Research & Evaluation (TARE)**, whose purpose was to monitor threat assessments, identify reliable and unreliable ones. Given that TARE would involve the sharing and analysis of confidential information, the EU-SEC Partners agreed that this proposal was not feasible at that stage of the EU-SEC Project. The second proposal was to develop a **Joint Media Response Exercise to Security Breaches at Simultaneous Events**. The aim of this table top exercise was to identify differences in media management policies between partner countries in response to serious security breaches with community relationship implications. Lastly, Finland suggested a **CEPOL Research Programme Dedicated to Major Event Security**. Such a programme could draw upon many of the research topics and questions identified in this chapter. The EU-SEC Partners acknowledged the utility and importance of these two proposals, but they considered these exercises too ambitious and, therefore, suggested that they be reconsidered at a later stage.

4.3 Conclusions

The data gathered through the EU-SEC questionnaire and meetings clearly suggested that existing national research programmes on major event security in Europe need to be improved. Most partners were able to point to some specific areas of research activity, even though none did so with any clear reference to the existence of any national research programme as such. The areas most frequently alluded to were Legality & Policy, Plans & Planning, Venues, Vetting & VIPs, Resources & Capacity, Internal & External Cooperation, International Cooperation, Public Order Policing, Media & Communication, Terrorism & Threat Assessments, Establishing Research Activity, Technology Development, Role of Private Security and Evaluation and Information Sharing.

Based on these findings, the Finnish Police College drafted eight ideas for future joint activities aimed at enhancing the cooperation and coordination of national research from major event security. The EU-SEC Partners welcomed all proposals and chose five of them for immediate application. The next step is to explore which resources are available to develop these proposals and which obstacles may hinder their concrete application.

Chapter 5

Resources for Joint Transnational Research Activities

Which are the resources that the EU-SEC participating countries have at their disposal to develop and implement joint research activities, and which are the obstacles that may hamper these activities? The purpose of this chapter is to explore and identify financial, legal, political and cultural issues that facilitate or hinder the exchange of data, research and best practice on the security at major events among the EU-SEC Countries.

The chapter starts examining the legal framework of the information exchange, including the EC resolutions and recommendations and the bilateral/multilateral agreements among the EU-SEC Countries. Then it offers an analysis of the established EU policing networks that support the coordination of research activities. The third part of the chapter analyses lessons learnt and obstacles in the area of security procurement projects. The last part explores how the EU-SEC Countries manage resources for security research in terms of funds, people, coordination, procurements etc.

The chapter is based on two studies. The first was conducted by the UK Metropolitan Police assisted by the University of Southampton. The second study was co-led by two bodies of the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium für Inneres, B.M.I): the “Institute for Science and Research” of the Sicherheitsakademie and Section II/2. Both studies received several inputs from the EU-SEC Countries through questionnaires and technical workshops.²⁵

5.1 The legal framework

To assist the international cooperation and to synchronize national research approaches in the field of security at major events, many EU and EC resolutions and recommendations have been produced. The table below summarises the main steps towards an improved research cooperation among EU Member States.

Main legal documents
<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Council Joint Action 97/339/JHA of 26 May 1997 with regard to cooperation on law and order and security.▪ Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on Preventing and restraining football hooliganism through the exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy (97/C 193/01). It was decided that an annual situation report concerning football vandalism in the Member States would be drafted²⁶, and that there should be an annual meeting of experts with the aim of exchanging relevant experience and strengthening contacts.

²⁵ The EU-SEC Countries answered to three questionnaires: one prepared by the Metropolitan Police (see Annex 3) and two prepared by the Austrian team (see Annex 4).

²⁶ The objectives of the report were: 1) Give an accurate overview of the current situation throughout the Member States; 2) Identify any weakness in the current system as a basis for future rectification; 3) Increase the levels of international cooperation and mutual assistance between Law Enforcement Agencies.

- Council Resolution of 17 December 2001 presenting a handbook of recommendations for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches (2002/C 22/01).
- Council Resolution on 25 April 2002 concerning the creation of a national information centre on football vandalism (2002/ L 121/1) in all Member States, with a view towards reinforcing information available to police forces at European level.
- Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (2002/348/JHA). It established a network of national football information points with the aim of improving the co-operation and the information exchange between police forces and other competent authorities combating football-related violence.
- Council Resolution of 29 April 2004 on security at European Council meetings and other comparable events (2004/C 116/06). It invited Member States to supply the Member State hosting a European Council meeting or another comparable event with any information available to them on movements by individuals or groups who may aim to disrupt public order at the event or commit offences relating to the event.
- Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2006/C 322/01).
- On 1 September 2006 the EU Commission published a *Green Paper on detection and associated technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs and other security authorities* which addressed, *inter alia*, improvement of the protection of mass events (COM (2006) 474 final). The Commission proposed to organise a study on the protection on mass events, analysing what security tools, equipment and expertise applied in the protection of mass events are transferable from one event to another. The study should also provide inputs and recommendation about the development of Community-owned equipment, Community-shared equipment and business model for services provided by the private sector.

The EU-SEC countries also have at their disposal different legal resources to ensure police or judicial cooperation with other countries, including:

- **Bilateral co-operation treaties** like for example the **German-Austrian Treaty in Police and Justice Affairs** that includes provision in terms of Strategic Partnership in Security Matters, Common Forms of Co-operation, Special Forms of Co-operation, Other Forms of Co-operation and Data and Tracing Association/Protection of Data Privacy.
- **Multilateral treaties**, starting from the **Schengen police co-operation measures** that provide legal basis for mutual assistance and direct information exchange between police services, cross-border surveillance and pursuit of suspects, improved communication links and information exchange via central law-enforcement agencies. Another example is the **Benelux Police Cooperation Treaty** through which the police agencies of the Benelux countries (Belgian, Dutch and Luxemburg) can work closely together in different field activities such as patrolling, mutual assistance in case of major events and incidents and the exchange of information, equipment and personnel.
- Provisional **ad hoc agreements** and **protocols** for major events, especially with regard to international or European football tournaments.

These treaties and agreements provide different forms of cooperation, including:

- Exchange of information (for example, the Schengen agreement includes exchange of police information in the fight against cross-border crime).
- Exchange of liaison officers, especially for football events.
- Exchange of material (i.e. France received water canons from Belgium for the G8 Summit).
- Direct cooperation in border areas such as mixed patrols.
- Deployment of police officers in a country that host major events
- Joint training courses or exchange of training programs.
- Judicial cooperation and public prosecutor cooperation (including joint investigation).
- Exchange of liaison officers.
- Cross-border cooperation to secure rail links or seaports.

5.2 The police networking system

Alongside with the legal resources, there are policing information networks that assist EU Member States to synchronize national approaches and coordinate research activities. The situation is particularly promising in the area of **football policing network** that drives its cohesion and commitment to sharing information and research from the following factors:²⁷

- The Council Resolution of 17 December 2001 that decided that all Member State must designate a single national point of contact (NFIPs) for football policing issues related to European or international games.
- The popularity, the national prestige and the investments from the private sector (sponsorships etc) that football events tend to attract.
- The need of countries to comply with stadium standards and ensure proper behaviour by its football fans in order not to incur FIFA or UEFA bans.
- The easiness with which expertise on football events can be transferred to other major public events.
- The high political visibility of international football events that has ensured that football policing cooperation become a EU priority (see all Council Resolutions).

In general, countries hosting very high-profile football events make significant efforts to promote information-sharing. For example, in preparing for the 2006 World Cup, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior organised three international conferences in Berlin in 2002 and 2003 to share experiences on major sporting and football events.²⁸

The football network is also developing a peer review process, as proposed in EU Presidency note “Proposals relating to the enhancement of measures to counter football related violence” (7017/04, ENFOPOL 23). The website, mentioned in this document, has been constructed and is available as the European National Football Information Point website, under password control for NFIPs and Europol, on the UK Centrex [police central training facility] website.²⁹

²⁷ The general information in this section was derived from an Interview with Mr. Bryan Drew, QPM, Director of the UK Football Policing Unit, 12/10/06.

²⁸ BMI Data and Facts, ‘2006 FIFA World Cup: Security for players and spectators’, http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_165354/Internet/Content/Themen/Innere_Siche, accessed 16/10/06

²⁹ EU Council, Police Cooperation Working Party (experts on major sporting events), ‘Outcome of Proceedings’, 22/9/06, 13118/06, ENFOPOL 158, Brussels, 3/10/06 and see also Police Cooperation Working Party (experts on major sporting events) Room Documents 2004-12-14/05 of 8/12/04 and 2006-09-22/02 of 18/9/06

Outside the football arena, the most important network is represented by the **Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT)** which is an inter-agency network with governmental recognition. PWGT utilizes both its own secure communications network and links into a network of national liaison officers known as CTELOs (Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers). For example, the UK CTELO in France is attached to UCLAT in Paris and the French CTELO to the UK is located within the new Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorist Command [SO15]. The UK's CTELO network, which will total 25 overseas posted officers by mid-2008, also covers non-EU states, e.g., Australia, Algeria and Pakistan.³⁰

In field of counter-terrorism, **EUROPOL** and the **Club of Berne**³¹ represent important networks through which European Countries can exchange information and arrange secure communication channels.

In addition to these networks, there are a number of structures and services that help existing policing networks access information, identify best practice and develop a sense of legacy. Above all, it is important to mention:

- **Initiatives developed by EU Countries.** For example, the UK's response to 9/11 has developed quite a significant national protective security advisory system based around the Security Service's National Security Advisory Centre [NSAC] and the police staffed National Counter-Terrorism Security Office [NaCTSO]. NSAC is multi-agency in personnel and has a wide private sector outreach through its Security Advisers.³² NaCTSO supports a network of over 100 local police force based specialist police officers known as Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers [CTSAs]. Among their activities, those two bodies produce and disseminate publicly available information and research related to event security. For example, in 2006 NaCTSO has produced a publicly available booklet entitled 'Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Stadia and Arenas'.³³
- **CEPOL** (the European Police College) that disseminates best practice and research findings in areas such as anti-terrorism, public security, public order and safety.
- A vast array of **open sources materials** in the fields of risk analysis, threat analysis and risk and threat management, including official advisory briefs, academic textbooks, the publications of specialized research institutes such as the US Penn State University's Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response (ISTAR www.istar.upenn.edu) and the reports and annual assessments of private sector bodies such as the Control Risks Group (www.crg.com) and Transparency International (www.transparency.org).³⁴

³⁰ A brief examination of the history of the UK police public order intelligence system provides some basic understanding of a national response in this area. The catalyst for the evolution of the UK National Public Order Intelligence Unit [NPOIU] was concern about the person and economic activity threatening behaviour and actions of animal-rights groups in the early 1980s. This led to the creation of a unit to establish and manage an intelligence source known as the Animal Rights National Index [ARNI]. The ARNI had originally been based upon open-source research but later also utilised police Special Branch humint sources. By the 1990s, with the rise of environmental protest groups, the ARNI unit was also logging information and intelligence on non-animal rights extremist groups. In 2000 ARNI was merged into a new police central facility, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit [NPOIU] which has now evolved into a much broader structure. The NPOIU has no website system for sharing information but it does produce a hard copy 'Weekly Overview' report for UK official use and it also produces, as an open source shareable on request resource, a 'Protective Tactics Manua'. This can be shared with EU partners and others in the PWGT network.

³¹ The Club of Berne is an informal gathering of the Heads of EU Member States' security and intelligence services, plus Norway and Switzerland. They meet on a regular basis to discuss intelligence and security matters.

³² NSAC, 'Providing Security Advice', <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page76.html>, accessed 23/11/06

³³ NaCTSO 2006 – contactable via nactso@btconnect.com,

³⁴ In the UK there has been a quite lively production of literature. HM Treasury has published *Managing risks to the public: appraisal guidance*, (October 2004); the Control Risks Group publishes an annual *Risk Map* and Blackwells publishes *Risk Analysis* as an international journal containing articles such as 'Assessing the Risks of Terrorism: A Special Collection of Perspectives Articles by Former Presidents of the Society for Risk Analysis'. Professional bodies

It should also be added that the EU Council of Ministers has issued a number of Security Handbooks for national police forces that contain practical examples of how to improve police co-operation. In particular there the following documents:

- In 2001 the Council approved the *Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved* (2002/C 22/01). In December 2006 the Council of the European Union approved a Resolution concerning an *updated Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved* (2006/C322/01). In the new handbook, the Council recommended the exchange of information through a permanent national (police) football information point (NFIP) established by each Member State.
- In 2002 the Council approved the *Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the European Council* (12637/3/02, ENFOPOL 123). The Handbook is a living document that provides practical instruments and catalogue of ideas for the Member States that undertake the task of providing security at major events or providing assistance for the host authorities. The main implementing requirement was for each Member State to appoint a 'national contact point' responsible for collecting, exchanging and disseminating information and risk analyses, and for establishing reliable and efficient lines of communication to relevant key players nationally and internationally. In 2006, the document was revised with the *Security handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events* (15226/1/06). This is an extension of the previous report in that it now includes measures of security (both from the public order and counter-terrorism perspective) of all major international events including, but not limited to political, sporting, social and cultural events. The revision also contains a Standard form for exchanging information regarding individuals posing a terrorist threat. In 2007, it was proposed to have the latest Handbook (9679/1/07) replace the two previous reports in order to improve recommendations.
- In 2004 the Council approved the *Handbook for the cooperation between MS to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and comparable sporting events* (5744/1/04). The document invited Member States to assist the organising Member State to collect and analyse information on the event in order to draw up accurate and timely threat assessment and risk analysis.³⁵ In 2007 the document was revised with the *Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension* (10589/1/07). The recommendations of the latest report are as follows:

also make important contributions in this field. In the UK, The Institute of Risk Management, The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers and The National Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector have collaborated in drawing up a *Risk Management Standard*.

³⁵ A similar expectation is found in the EU Presidency note 'Proposals relating to the enhancement of measures to counter football related violence' (7017/04, ENFOPOL 23) which contains suggestions as to improvements that could be made to the *Football Handbook* such as: improving the operational use of categories of estimated risk, better information on Member States travel restrictions rules, using the annual ad hoc report on football vandalism compiled by Belgium, the UK, The Netherlands and Germany, mutual assessments of police effectiveness at major football events and developing a website.

- To set up co-operation, in particular, practical co-operation information sharing between competent authorities in order to ensure public security at major events with an international dimension held in the Member States of the European Union.
- To that end, ensure that the handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension, annexed hereto, is made available to relevant competent authorities.

5.3 Obstacles to transnational activities

How effectively the EU-SEC participating countries can cooperate in joint research activities? What are the most common obstacles that hamper the exchange of information and research in Europe? A questionnaire drafted by the UK Team addressed these specific issues by asking the EU-SEC countries to report legal provisions or law enforcement and intelligence service rules of procedure that might be termed ‘obstacles’ to research, information or intelligence sharing with other EU Member States or with non-EU states. Quite interestingly, the EU-SEC Participating Countries did not report many problems apart from constraints in the sharing of personal data under both data protection and human rights legislation.³⁶ Among the States that provided feedback to the questionnaire, the following constraints were suggested:

- Lack of common standards to collect, report and share information on security at major events (i.e. national differences in vetting systems).
- Limits in the use of information provided by the private sector.
- Needs to improve cooperation between police and non-police organisations. It is not clear to what extent national security agencies are knowledgeable about non-police sources and data repositories.
- Constraints in the sharing of security classified sources. In the area of sharing information/research on extremism and terrorism there is a preference for using trusted bilateral or non-EU inter-agency networks. In this area, EU States do not fully comply with the EU Council’s proposals on the ‘principle of availability’³⁷ whereby ‘all law enforcement agencies in the EU should have access to all data held by other law enforcement agencies for the broad purpose of cooperation to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute crime and threats to security.’

As a complement to this study, the University of Southampton explored the problems that EU States encountered in the broader area of exchange of information on security issues. The study suggested the existence of some further problems:

- Information or research that might be derived in whole or in part from national intelligence sources, such as a UK JTAC Assessment (Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre), is only shared in a suitably indirect manner and on a strictly ‘need to know’ basis.
- In the area of sharing of information/research on extremism and terrorism, States tend to use trusted bilateral or non-EU inter-agency networks.
- Outside the football area, the police information/research sharing networks work in a diversified environment where problems and solutions change from country to country.
- Some countries are not well acquainted with the existing repository of information and knowledge.

³⁶ EU Council, ‘Proposed Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’, 13246/06, LIMITE, CRIMORG 143, ENFOPOL 161, 27/9/06

³⁷ EU Council, ‘Hague Programme- on EU JHA Cooperation to 2008’, Council Doc. 13302/2/04 REV 2 of 5/11/2004, Section 2.1

- In the football area, the EU Member States do not have the same level of resources and networks that support their national contact points. Therefore capabilities to exchange information differ from country to country.

5.4 Coordination of research programmes on security equipment: a case study

Technology solutions are increasingly used in the work of security agencies responsible for planning and providing security during major events. Technology is largely employed to detect dangerous substances, protect participants, check goods, guarding infrastructures and other important security activities. In this respect, the UK team attempted to capture information about problems in the research exchange on security equipment procurement. In a questionnaire completed by the EU-SEC participating countries, questions 6 and 7 explored the level of coordination of the national security procurement projects, while questions 3 and 4 attempted to identify existing obstacles that hamper the development of common initiatives among the EU-SEC Countries in the field of security procurement research (see the UK Questionnaire in Annex 3). In particular, the questionnaire asked countries if and how they could participated in a UK ‘sniffer’ dogs’ project that has been developed by the Metropolitan Police with the aim to improve the detection of peroxide based explosives. Moreover, following some of the Finnish Police College’s suggestion for boosting future joint activities (see chapter 2.3), the UK questionnaire explored the EU-SEC availability to participate in a hypothetical project on ‘optimal chemical detection device’.

Two main points emerged from the answers of the EU-SEC countries. The first is that, compared to the UK case, it seems that the other EU-SEC countries have not developed a system for the coordination of the national security procurement projects. As shown in Table 1, most of the participating countries have not drafted a strategy similar to the UK ‘Police Science and Technology Strategy 2004-2005’ (PSTS 04-09) for the delivery of the Government’s priorities presented in the National Policing Plan (NPP).³⁸ Neither do they seem to possess a structure like the UK Home Office Science, Research & Statistics (HOSDB) that undertakes research projects to inform policy and make the best use of new technologies. It seems that the other EU-SEC countries have rather disperse allocation of responsibilities across a range of both public and private sector bodies.

Table 1. Results of the UK Questionnaire.

Project Partner Country	Do you have a strategy similar to UK PSTS?	Comments	Do you have an organisation similar to UK HOSDB?	Comments	Relevant weblinks
Austria	No	Projects are run on a case by case basis	No		
Finland	No	Projects are run on a case by case basis	No	The Police Technical Centre does scope and trial police equipment.	
France					
Germany					
Ireland	No		No		
Italy					
Netherlands					
Portugal	No	Only general	Not at present	A new Interior Ministry	www.mctes.pt

³⁸ Police Science and Technology Strategy 2004-2009, [PSTS 04-09]04
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/PoliceST-S2_part_11.pdf,

		national strategies run by Min. of Sc. & Tech.	Research centres are found in, e.g., the Police Staff College	law foresees the estab. Of a Dir. Of Res. & Planning in Internal Affairs	www.esp.pt www.academiampilatar.pt www.ispjcc.pt
Spain					

Source: UK Questionnaire (questions 6 and 7)

The second point that emerged from the questionnaire is that, as shown in Table 2, the EU-SEC Countries would welcome proposals for transnational cooperation in the field of security procurement provided that:

- There is a formal invitation process from a recognised national authority in the research/project.
- The proposals for cooperation fit with national priorities and do not overlap with current national initiatives. Some countries would need a scoping survey to determine whether or not relevant research is already being carried out within the EU.
- Funding sources are available. In some case, the existence of an EU funding source such as AGIS or ESRP could be seen as a facilitating factor.

Table 2. Results of the UK Questionnaire.

Project Partner Country	Could you join another MS project like the 'sniffer dogs' ³⁹	Linked Issues	Finnish proposal for an 'optimal chemical detection device' project	Linked Issues
Austria	Possible to respond to a <u>formal</u> invitation	Funding – possible, need to explore EU AGIS Programme funding. ⁴⁰	Possible to respond to a <u>formal</u> invitation	*Funding – possible, need to explore EU AGIS Programme funding. *Could be more useful to study 'deterrence' methods more widely.
Finland	Yes – Hds, of Finnish Dog Trg. & Helsinki Bomb Unit keen to join.	Amount of funding needed	Own initiative – key issues (1) reliability (2) public acceptability.	To be linked to wider threat assessment process.
France	Yes	Financial & Project Mgt. issues need further study	Yes	Financial & Project Mgt. issues need further study
Germany	<i>No reply</i>			
Ireland	Possible – depending on a national benefits analysis		Possible – depending on a national benefits analysis	
Italy	<i>No reply</i>			
Netherlands	<i>No reply</i>			
Portugal	Possible but dependent on PSP & GNR agreement	Funding & project mgt. – might look for EU-SEC support	Possible but dependent on PSP & GNR interest	Info on any such existing project. Funding
Spain	<i>No reply</i>			
UK	Yes – depending on (1)national priorities (2)existing national initiatives		Yes – interested in solution options BUT without sharing data on national vulnerabilities	

Source: UK Questionnaire (questions 3 and 4)

³⁹ A follow-up from the topics noted for further exploration in the Finnish 'Summary of Results' Report

⁴⁰ European Commission [JHA], 'Cooperation in practice – EU funding support in the area of freedom, security and justice – AGIS', http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/agis/funding_agis_en.htm, accessed 26/10/06

As a complement to the data collected through the UK Questionnaire, the University of Southampton explored the area of cooperation and coordination of defence procurement projects in Europe. Compared to the security procurement, the European defence procurement area has a longer history that starts with the post-1945 attempts of developing procurement collaboration through NATO, bilateral and multilateral projects. Although the history of collaborative defence procurement is littered with failed projects and accounts of the complexities of the agreement, financial arrangements and project management, it has also recorded some successes⁴¹. Therefore the UK Team considered helpful an exploring exercise in this area, especially in terms of identification of lessons learnt that can be transferred to the sector of security procurement.

The study suggested that the most common problems in the area of European defence procurement:

- Difficulties in agreeing the Operational Requirement [OR].
- Multinational projects and efforts are often vulnerable to national political decisions and governed by principle of fair return on investment (“juste retour”) that might either reduce the number of partner-countries or the scale of the production-run.
- European countries are under pressures from national defence industries that wish to secure particular national commercial advantages.
- Cost control problems.
- In the area of counter-terrorism, it is very likely that the national fora within which procurement research is developed will operate in very restrictive security classification mode. Therefore any consequent trans-national research sharing which does occur is likely to be restricted to those countries with which a state has particularly privileged bilateral relations or within some privileged multi-lateral framework like the EU G6 group.⁴²

The European Commission has been trying to persuade Member States to address these problems for some time. Its latest attempt was represented by the 2004 *Green Paper on Defence Procurement* whereby the Commission provided suggestions to contribute to the creation of a European defence equipment market (EDEM). In particular, the Commission proposed two ideas. The first was to develop an interpretative communication to clarify the complex EU’s legal framework ‘in order to facilitate application by the competent authorities and to improve the operators’ understanding of it’. The second was to supplement the EU’s legal framework with a new specific legal instrument for defence procurement, such as a directive to coordinate the procedures for awarding contracts.⁴³

Moreover, the European defence procurement has, at the present, an advantage over the embryonic attempts to promote European internal security equipment procurement collaboration through its longer established organisational structures. Since 1996 the **Joint Organisation for Armaments Cooperation** (OCCAR – given legal personality in 2000), open to all EU states (but currently only comprising the ‘big five’ defence industry states; Germany, Belgium, France, Italy & UK), has been trying to replace ‘the system of “juste retour” per programme by an “overall juste retour” covering several years and several programmes.’⁴⁴

In 2003 the European Commission developed a **European Security Research Programme** (ESRP). This initiative used Commission powers, under Article 157(2)EC, to prompt Member States

⁴¹ See. For example, F.Hood, ‘European Defence Procurement; The Future ?’, Report on Wilton Park Conference WP734, 2-4 Feb. 2004, Wilton Park/FCO, March 2004 and see also:- M.Alexander & T.Garden, ‘Counting the cost of Europe’s Security Needs’, *International Security*, 77(3) 2001 and A.Missiroli, ‘Plough Shares into Swords ?’, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8(1) 2003

⁴² Clarification of the issues in this section was assisted through an interview with Mr. John Moore, Managing Director of MFD International, consulting security engineers, on 15/11/06

⁴³ Commission of the EC, ‘GREEN PAPER- Defence Procurement’, Brussels, 23.09.2004, COM(2004)608 final

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.8

to address the need for coordinated action on EU industrial competitiveness issues in the security area. Under these powers the Commission may 'take any useful initiative to promote such coordination.'⁴⁵ There are three important aspects to this Commission initiative which are relevant to the EU-SEC project. Firstly, the Commission used, initially, a politically low-visibility policy development route by setting up a 'Group of Personalities' [GoP] in October 2003 to draft proposals.⁴⁶ Secondly, the GoP contained a significant industrial representation from EADS, BAE Systems, Thales, Finmeccanica, Indra, Siemens and Diehl.

More recently, in 2004, the EU set up the **European Defence Agency (EDA)**⁴⁷ to help Member States meet their capabilities goals under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Among the ways EDA seeks to achieve its goals there is one which might be seen as comparable to the needs of the internal security area that is 'Helping them [Member States] to identify common needs and promoting collaboration through common solutions.'⁴⁸ The EDA is, in EU institutional terms, an Agency of the EU operating under the Authority of the Council of Ministers with the EU's Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, as its Head of Agency and Chair of the Steering Board of Defence Ministers.

5.5 The management and coordination of national resources

A further element to discuss in this chapter is how the EU-SEC participating countries manage and coordinate their resources to conduct research programmes. Although no specific information have been collected, the countries' experience in planning and implementing security for major events provides some important indication. In particular, their practical experience show that security planners should take into consideration the following strategic elements before planning the security of a major event:

- **Leadership:** All participating countries appoint a person or body responsible for planning and implementing security of the major event. The advantages of central resources management have been expressed in terms of overview, control on local decision, good sharing of best practices, access to the best-equipped and trained resources, and reduction of risks of duplication. However, a centralised structure can also cause more delays and domination by larger forces.
- **Plans and structure:** There are consolidated procedures to articulate who has responsibility for planning and delivering what, where and when.
- **Budget planning:** In most of the countries, there is a common budget for the assignment of personnel and resources for police activities. In Germany, the Netherlands and in United Kingdom there are either the states (Länder) or the regions responsible for their budget. In case of major events, extra-budgets can be produced.
- **Past experience:** All EU-SEC Countries try to make use of regional, national and international experiences related to security at major events such as the G8 Summit, the Olympic Games and the World/European Football Cup.
- **Integration and coordination:** Most of the countries ensure that all the different branches of planning are integrated, complementary and coordinated. Exercises are important to test security procedures, teams' competence and effectiveness of security plans.

⁴⁵ House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 12th Report of Session 2003-04, HC 42-xii, Para 5.4, March 2004

⁴⁶ The discussion of the GoP draws upon Hayes, op. cit., pp.13f

⁴⁷ Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP to set up a European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted by the Council on 12 July 2004, OJ L 245/17, 17/7/04

⁴⁸ EDA 'Why the European Defence Agency?', <http://eda.europa.eu/>, accessed 3/10/06

- **Media strategy:** All countries acknowledge that media communication and monitoring is a key element for the success of the major event. Therefore countries appoint a press liaison officer or a special team to communicate with the community, the media and, if necessary, with demonstrators.
- **Cooperation with private organizations:** There exists tools to cooperate with the private sectors, such as contact points or informal networks.

5.6 Conclusions

The EU has made significant efforts to encourage the sharing of information and knowledge on security at major events among the EU countries. A considerable amount of work has been done in terms of legal tools, policing networks, data repositories and national initiatives. This chapter has suggested that the football network offers a particular good example of areas of best practice. Moreover, it has shown that the EU-SEC participating countries do not report any significant legal or bureaucratic barrier that may hinder the launch and development of a multinational research projects on security at major events. The next step will be to try to understand how these countries can effectively use these resources to implement joint research activities.

Chapter 6

Implementing Joint Research Activities in Cooperation with the Private Sector

Private Public Partnerships represent a partnership between the public sector and private sector for the purpose of delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by the public sector. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse why PPPs are becoming increasingly important in Europe and explore how PPP can effectively contribute to the coordination of the national research and policies on major events security.

The chapter is mainly based on the experience that the French *Direction de la Formation de la Police Nationale* (D.F.P.N) accumulated in 2007 when they launched an international “Call for ideas” to foster partnerships between the public and private sector. The call was an opportunity to invite some private companies to elaborate the two ideas Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) and the European Major Events Register (EMER) (see chapter 4) and make a technical presentation before a scientific panel to choose the ‘preferred supplier’.

6.1 The importance of PPP

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) is becoming increasingly common in Europe across different social and political sectors. The pivotal idea of PPPs is that both the public and private sectors have certain advantages in terms of time, performance and costs. PPPs can increase the efficiency of public services, balance insufficient public resources, reduce costs, avoid duplication of efforts and speed up product development.

In the field of security at major events, PPPs represent an advantageous model of project and service delivery across an range of areas including building and management of infrastructures such as stadiums or sports stadiums, internal security within venues hosting major events, coordination of efforts to safeguard critical infrastructures, benefit for private sector expertise (cyber crime, for example) and advance technologies, gathering of intelligence or better knowledge of incidents and others.

Although potentially productive, there are many difficulties, stumbling blocks and gaps that hamper PPP. One of the problems is the **communication** between the public and private sectors. Public authorities may find sometimes difficulties in understanding the benefits offered by the market, while the private sector does not always provide consumer-oriented products due to time constraints and market pressure. Similarly with the public security sector there is a general shared feeling that private companies seek to differentiate themselves within the market through rushed innovation and development while simultaneously applying pressure to adjust public requirements to a rapidly evolving product market.

There are also **constraints in sharing information**. Public and private internal regulations sometimes hamper the sharing of sensitive data. Moreover, information needs to be selected and filtered before being shared. This process requires time and costs that neither private nor public authorities may be prepared to cover.

Lack of trust may be also a problem. In the field of security, the public actors are afraid that the quality of outputs provided by a profit-driven private operator is likely to be lower than what would be achieved by the public sector. Without appropriate and credible means of control and quality indicators from the public party, scepticism over PPPs is likely to increase.

PPPs are also deemed unsuitable for sectors with fast-pace technological change, such as IT. It is almost impossible to set credible quality outputs for a long-term period without hampering possible innovations and constant improvement in the quality of services. Frequent renegotiations to adapt the contract to technological development would be costly, thus contradicting the basic reason for PPP adoption: the creation of value for money.

6.2 Practical suggestions to foster PPP through call for proposals

How practically can PPP model be fostered in the area of security at major events? The experience developed by the EU-SEC partners provides some important indication. The French *Direction de la Formation de la Police Nationale* (D.F.P.N) launched in 2007 a “Pilot Call for Ideas” with the aim to develop two proposals: the Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) and the European Major Events Register (EMER). As has been seen in chapter 4, these innovative technological tools have been designed to increase the coordination among EU-SEC participating countries in the field of security during major events. The call was directed towards the private sector. D.F.P.N. launched officially the call at The Hague in October 2007 and, subsequently, private companies and research institutes were invited to provide inputs into the design of STEP and EMER.

The following lessons have been learnt from this work experience:

- **Ensuring open market access and competition:** PPPs comply with the operation of open markets and with the clear and transparent rules of these markets. This issue is particularly relevant with respect to tendering and selection procedures for private partners, since some of them might have been invited to take part, jointly with representatives of the public sector, in the identification of needs stage. This can create a *vulnus* in the tendering procedures, since other competitors might deem that those who participated in the initial stage hold a comparative advantage when preparing the bid. Procurement procedures must therefore respect the principles and rules setting out the need for open and fair competition, transparency and proportionality.
- **Target:** A strategy and a deep analysis of the targeted companies interested in being involved in the partnership’s proposal should be undertaken in advance. It is not sufficient just to identify the right company or the right target but the company or prospective companies should also be involved from the very beginning at the partnership table, assembling the right people with the authority to take decisions and commit resources on behalf of their organizations. It is important that those who manage responsibility in partnership initiatives have the seniority to take decisions and commit resources on behalf of their organization.
- **Timing:** Successful PPPs design requires that all parties are brought together at an early stage. PPPs cannot be seen as a top/down initiative but rather must be built through an early and timely process of consultation and negotiation among partners, where an independent body like UNICRI has a pivotal role in terms of facilitating the process. As a special reference for the private sector, it should be involved as a full participant in the project and not just a single provider of technological tools or products. There is, indeed, a problem of timing perspectives to divide the public and the private sector. Whereas the public sector, sometimes supported by

international organizations as in this case, usually carries out multi-annual programmes or projects, private companies need to achieve results, distribute gains among their shareholders within a short time-frame. Therefore, trying to persuade companies with the argument of long-term benefits for the image and visibility of their enterprise, while in the short-term suggesting they should be investing money without earnings, is a difficult task.

- **A legal and financial system at national and international level that is conducive to the establishment of PPP:** PPPs in some cases can require substantial reform of legal and financial systems in Member States to make their application possible. This requires possibly actions to define the role of the public sector, institutional capacity building at all levels including the allocation of qualified and motivated staff to specialized PPP units and the development of private sector investment facilitation mechanisms.
- **Involvement of the decision makers:** PPPs need to involve from the very beginning at the partnership table the right people with the authority to take decisions and commit resources on behalf of their organizations.

6.3 Conclusions

Although primary responsibility to provide and deliver security at major events lies with national authorities, State action alone is not enough and private sector input is essential. Ownership of security is not exclusive to the public domain and it should be further defined as to what extent security should be owned by the private sector.

The EU-SEC Project and its “Call for ideas” were an important experience to explore how public and private sectors can effectively cooperate in implementing security during major events. This chapter has suggested a number of practical steps that the EU Countries may take into consideration before developing PPPs practices. The main conclusion is that the PPPs model can be a productive instrument provided that common benefits are clearly identified, legal and financial constraints are analysed, right candidates for partnership are selected, and mutual trust is built.

Chapter 7

Ethical issues

The main aim of this chapter is to provide guidance on the links between ethical issues and security during major events. In particular, it explores how ethical issues are taken into consideration in the different aspects of the research on security during major events. The chapter is based on the study of the German *Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei (DHPol)* (former *Polizei-Führungsakademie des Bundes und der Länder*) in Muenster.⁴⁹

7.1 Ethical Issues

7.1.1 Ethical issues and European Research

The EU-SEC Project is fulfilled within the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development 2002-2006 (FP6) of the European Commission as part of ERA-NET. This is designed to step up the cooperation and coordination of national or regional research activities through the networking of existing research programmes, including the development and implementation of joint activities. Article 3 of the FP6 states that all the research activities implemented under the Sixth Framework Program must be carried out in compliance with fundamental ethical principles.

The European Commission emphasizes the need for consideration of ethical issues (among others) to raise awareness among researchers of the impact of technological change on humanity. Further tasks are to evaluate research from philosophical, ethical and social perspectives, to promote public understanding and the discussion of new technologies and the surrounding ethical debate. It also needs to explore the impact of research and its potential application on personal privacy and human dignity, to discuss possible cross-linking of databases and privacy and confidentiality, implications and possible increased risk to e.g. security, privacy, non-discrimination or accountability.

Also a further challenge is raising awareness of ethics amongst researchers - particularly for the new technologies. This is promoted by the European Commission to ensure that ethical analysis develops rapidly enough to be taken into account in future policy development and research governance within the European Union.

7.1.2 Ethical principles and sources

In common English usage, ethics has at least four meanings. In one sense, ethics is a synonym for ordinary morality (those universal standards of conduct that apply to moral agents simply because they are moral agents). In at least three other senses, ethics differs from morality. For the purpose of

⁴⁹ The following members of the team have been working on the study: Professor Dr. Hans-Gerd Jaschke, Regierungsdirektor Dr. Wolfgang Kokoska, Professor Dr. Joachim Kersten, Polizeidirektor Karsten Gräfe, Birgit Winkelsett M.A., Verena Schulze and Ansgar Burchard. Due to the fact that main German experts in the field of ethics in policing are working at the German Police University, the WP5 team is grateful for excellent contributions from experts Dr. Siegfried Franke and Werner Schiewek.

the EU-SEC Project, the “fourth sense” of ethics is the most meaningful. That means, ethics can be used to refer to those morally permissible “standards of conduct” governing members of a group simply because they are members of that group. In this sense, ethics of research is for researchers, ethics of policing is for those doing police work or being concerned with policing and so on. Ethics (in this sense) is relative even though morality is not; it resembles law and custom, which can also vary from group to group and over time. By definition ethics in this sense must be at least morally permissible. There cannot be thieves’ “ethics” or torturers’ “ethics”, except with scare quotes around “ethics” to signal an analogical or perverted use. Ethics resembles law and custom in another way: it sets a standard to guide and evaluate conduct.

In a general sense, ethics is the study of right and wrong, good and evil. Beliefs and values regarding right and wrong are shaped, among others, by our parents, our friends and social environment, the communities of which we are part, our own perceptions and virtues widely accepted as human life, human dignity, integrity of the person, democracy, rule of law, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, freedom of research, privacy, liberty and security.

There are ethical concerns that arise when commonly accepted understandings are examined and different perspectives are revealed. Introducing new perspectives can create unexpected challenges to the status quo (both for individuals and for the organisation).

7.1.3 Analysing ethical issues

This chapter is meant to explore and study the way in which ethical issues are taken into consideration during major events. The European Commission fosters better integration of science in society. Therefore, responsible research is promoted. Researches involved should increase their capability of communicating in a coherent way to citizens and special groups, including policy makers and security planners.

In the framework of WP5, Ethical Issues on Security during Major Events regard:

- Different interests of actors within Major Events
 - Police and Media
- Ethical issues on policing Major Events
 - Ethics of Police Institutions
 - Police Professional Ethics
 - Tension (Police Management Culture; Police Culture; Cop Culture). In all organisations there is a plurality of values and interests that create conflicts between the views of individual members and those of the organisation. It requires virtues of courage and honesty from organisational members in order to be willing to raise value conflicts into consciousness. It also requires a virtue of generosity for organisational authorities to allow their examination. Practitioner-researchers, as “insiders” within an organisation, are embedded in the power/knowledge relations constituting that organisation.

- Methodology of Ethical Analysis
 - Empirical analyses
 - Application to:
 - Threat identification
 - Vulnerabilities analyses
 - Threat and harm assessment
 - Reviews and monitoring

The German team analysed possible methods to explore and study the way in which ethical issues were discussed and taken into consideration during different European major events. Among the main targets of this investigation, there were also the nature and structure of ethical sources such as: Humans Rights, European Values, National Constitutions, National Laws, European Code of Police Ethics, National Regulations for Major Events, as well as guidelines giving advice for policing major events.

Core issues such as the use of force, use of arms, data protection and information-gathering activities that might infringe on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals were discussed with experts. Major events generally seem to require more intrusive procedures of information gathering, such as electronic surveillance. The impact of such intrusive procedures and the possible posing of threats to civil liberties, privacy and other rights were among the research topics. Specific topics such as accreditation strategies or intelligence analysis were discussed in the context of those types of major events they are related to.

Moreover, widely discussed were professional police ethics (autonomous ethical decision-making in daily policing with a view to effective police work), the problems of tension among actors in the field of security related to major events and the issues of methodologies of ethical analysing and training of ethical decision-making.

7.2 Security during Major Events – Role of the police

Some types of major events are normally very complex situations with respect to processes. Characteristics of these situations include the involvement of various actors, with different interests and expectations in regard to the sequence of the event, the frame conditions and circumstances, handling and solving of problems, the public attention, and so on. One very important point is the security during such an event.

7.2.1 Police in a free democratic State under the Rule of Law

This is a central point of reference for the police. In free democratic States under the rule of law, police can be regarded as the essential guarantor for inner security in the State. That is related to a second issue: the police represent the monopoly of the use of force. That indicates a clearly exposed function with a considerable accumulation of power and, consequently, a huge responsibility in handling this power. Precautions have to be taken that measures of the police to guarantee security during major events are appropriate to the situation, effective, ethically justifiable and in accordance with the law. The professional way a democratic police force sees itself is related to these dimensions and takes them into account in its daily work. It still may be open, if exists “a free democratic theory of police” to which police officers can refer. In any case there have to be

standards and rules to be followed. All the consulted police experts agreed and underlined those principles.

The same experts also emphasised:

1) the principle of public control of the institution (external focus):

- judicial
- political
- societal
- media

2) the role of the police management (internal focus), that must take care of:

- compliance with the (written and unwritten) rules, such as laws, codes like the European Convention on Human Rights, rules of engagement, manuals and regulations, operational guidelines, tactical regulations, professional standards
- professional attitudes, beliefs and behaviour
- education, competencies and qualification of police officers
- organisation culture

The rules and standards can be more or less explicit and specific. They may refer to a particular event, typologies of events or policing in general. Overall the written rules are to be understood as behaviour binding regulations.

7.2.2 Role of Police in Major Events

To ensure security during major events there are two strategic aspects for the police to focus on: 1) prevention of dangers, hazards, criminal and administrative offences; 2) prosecution of criminal and administrative offences. Those general or basic functions of police have to be specified according to the specific event with its particular determining factors.

For this specification, it is of pivotal importance to carry out an accurate, comprehensive and valid threat assessment. Aspects like:

- subject matter of the event
- reason with respect to motive and occasion
- involved or engaged groups
- symbolic impact of the event
- potential of conflicts

have to be regarded, estimated and analysed.

It is obvious that there will be different results depending on the type of major event and, as a consequence, different concepts and strategies of dealing with them. So it makes a difference, whether the event is a sport event like the Olympics or a comparable sport event and a major football game, a large-scale cultural or a major religious event or celebration, or if it is a big social or political event like protest/demonstration or high level summit. Following is a brief description of the main features that a security system must put in place according to the type of event, whether the latter has a political connotation or not.

7.2.3 Specific Challenges in Political Events

Although every event has its own characteristics and may develop a unique interior dynamic, there is the likelihood that protests and demonstrations or high level summits entail a different "quality of challenge" for the police. In those events the role of the police is to guarantee and protect the

constitutional and legal rights of the involved groups, notwithstanding support or disapproval of the original cause for the event. It can be observed that sometimes organisers and societal groups' interests associated with the major event trigger conflict between the concerned groups.

They expect the police to protect them in exercising their rights, thus not being prevented from carrying out their activities. This demands a very sensitive strategy from the police to meet those expectations, with a balance between the freedom of individual rights and the security of people and the event itself. It is clear that the strategy and all operational measures of the police have also to be in accordance with the law and appropriate to the situation. That means also to align its concepts and actions with universal valid ethical commitments. The police must operate within the existing system of values and the legal framework to protect legal rights, without imposing its own ideas of the relevance of an event and good or bad attitudes and behaviour of the citizens in the situation.

Police have to take care that potential conflicts are held according to legal and democratic rules, especially without use of violence. Consequently they have to act against violent conduct and criminal offences by means of different measures, preventive and repressive, where necessary. In such cases they are bound to the basic principles of legitimacy and commensurability of measures. Furthermore, they also have to communicate their role in the specific event to the organisers as well as to the involved groups and the public.

All the above-mentioned steps are regularly fixed and documented in the police guidelines for the operation issued by the person responsible for the police operation. Additionally, there is often a supplementary statement that stresses the principle of de-escalation that the police are ordered to follow.

7.2.4 Sport, Cultural and Religious Events

In most sporting, cultural and religious events the role of the police is less prominent than in political events. It is normally the organisers that are mainly responsible for the security of the event. The function of the police is primarily to provide support, advice and care for order and security around the event. The nature of that kind of event is, in most cases, not so close to basic rights as the political ones, so that the potential for serious conflict occurs infrequently, when compared to political events.

7.3 Internal Police Communication

The perception of relevance of ethical issues for the police, knowledge of ethical standards, their relevance in their daily work - in general - and in policing major events - in specific -, the measures to promote them both in the attitude and behaviour of the individual police officer and the organisation as a whole, these are all part of a process at different levels and in different steps. A very important method is the internal police communication that can be divided in at least four spheres:

- education and training
- organisational socialisation
- “internal public relations”
- operational debriefing

7.3.1 Education and Training

Dealing with questions of police ethics and human rights, the role of law and its binding obligations for the police as a whole and each police officer is a fundamental and compulsory part in the education and training of all police officers in democratic societies. The roles of the police in a free and democratic constitutional State, the basic principle of the monopoly of force and its consequences and commitments, the relation of police and society, the system and institutions to control the police are all topics of the curriculum. These include aspects like the every day contact with the citizens, communication and interactive competencies, behaviour towards victims and offenders, use and abuse of force, group dynamics, escalation of violence and de-escalation possibilities. For the management level, the curriculum also includes other aspects like responsibility for the implementation, advancement and compliance respectively by the organisation and their members. It is to be regarded as the fundamental occupational ethics, learnt during systematic education.

7.3.2 Organisational Socialisation

A further relevant way to gain ethical competencies is in the daily work experience. That is the field of organisational socialisation. The learning processes in this field have a more informal characterization. Police officers "live" in their organization; step by step they grow and develop within the organization and its culture. This process is utterly normal and, in general, functional. But problematic developments can also occur, especially when sub-cultural phenomena like marginal groups with particular professional paradigms and deviant values and beliefs arise. This can result in patterns of behaviour not complying with the original ethical standards of the institution. There can also be specific structural and personal factors, which facilitate such an extreme dimension. Once more, in this context the responsibility of the police management has to be pointed out.

7.3.3 Internal Public Relations

"Internal PR" is part of the preparatory phase of major events. In this context the involved police officers are introduced to the occasional background of the event, its expected circumstances and estimated problematic aspects. They become familiar with the aim of the operation, the guidelines, the strategic concept and corresponding tactical measures of the operation. It's precisely at this stage that all aspects mentioned in the previous part of the chapter become concrete and practical for the specific situation.

7.3.4 Operational Debriefing

The fourth level takes place after the deployment: it is the step of debriefing. The critical reflection on the operation, what has happened for which cause, the identification of strengths and weaknesses, the detection of errors or problematic incidents and the performance evaluation have the function of control. Similarly important is the analysis of public reactions, particularly media coverage, as well as the complaints about police activities in the context of the event. All these factors, that are the result of the workshops arranged with police managers in charge of the operation and journalists, can improve awareness of ethical issues in police actions. This can lead to them being taken more seriously thus reducing or minimizing mistakes in future deployments.

7.4 External Police Communication

As far as the external police communication is concerned, the relationship of the police and the media is the centre of attention. Within democracies, the media are a fundamental means of democratic control. Their reports have a deep impact on the general mood and attitudes of the public. The role, behaviour and manners of the police especially, as the institution with the monopoly on the use of force, are issues frequently reported on by the media. Therefore, this relationship needs to be thoroughly examined.⁵⁰

Generally speaking, the relationship of police and media can be characterized as one of mutual dependence – each needs the other for different purposes. With regard to the police, the most prominent issue at stake is its legitimacy: the depiction of the police in general and reporting of difficult operations in particular are an important factor for the establishment and upholding of police legitimacy. Thus, the media function as a means of promoting the image of the police among the public.

With regard to the dependence of the media, it is based on the necessity of gathering serious and trustworthy information. Journalists are dependent on the police in order to get first-hand details about an operation and its background. Yet, the exchange of information is not an end in itself: firstly, when reporting on crucial events, the media too have to establish and maintain a certain image of themselves – an image of trustworthiness and credibility. It is the credibility that constitutes the basis for a second prominent factor: a large circulation and dissemination. Serious reporting as well as attaining a large circulation are two basic objectives the media have to accomplish. Thus, at a general level, the relationship of the police and the media shows a mutual dependency concerning central issues at stake on both sides.

If these are general terms – what does the actual relationship look like in routine practice, particularly with regard to security during major events? How do police and media handle their mutual dependency in exceptional contexts? Can one speak of some kind of cooperation? These questions have been explored and analysed in a number of workshops and expert discussions between police and media representatives and academics within the last months of the project. The following aspects can be regarded as basic outcomes.

First of all, representatives of both sides agreed on the fact that cooperation between police and media takes place in the context of major events and seemed to be basically satisfied with the way this cooperation is set up. One frequent statement was that, especially in comparison to former times, reproaches, accusations or even confrontations have steadily lost importance and given way to collaboration. This development is due to the fact that hostility and prejudices on both sides have gradually eroded and politically biased conflicts between police and media have become more a rarity than a frequent occurrence.

Secondly, the political climate between the two parties as well as the handling of the media by the police and vice versa has changed: the public relations aspect of the police force's work has undergone serious changes during the last decades. In particular, during major events the police provide comprehensive information as well as useful contacts in order to support reporting. The media, on the other side, rely on the public relations work of the police and use their contacts.

⁵⁰ Although we talk of “the media” in this context, actually only print media can be taken into consideration since only representatives of this field have been involved in the work package.

However, apart from this general satisfaction, there are critical statements that have turned up in the course of the discussions, two of which require a closer examination. In the first place, media representatives have criticized that, although the situation has improved, they still get the impression that the police are deliberately withholding necessary information. Police representatives, however, have maintained that such things do not occur on purpose; rather they are a consequence of the development inherent to major events as well as the endeavour to release only thoroughly examined information. At this point of discussion it becomes obvious that former problems still have an impact and measures need to be taken against persistent stereotypes on both sides.

In the second place, representatives of the police, as well as academics, pointed out that the media frequently present a distorted picture of the police: either a black or white image - but nothing in between. As a consequence, the public gets acquainted with an image of the police that can hardly be upheld when confronted with reality. This introduces a related aspect: the media, on one hand, are eager to report “the truth”, but on the other hand depend on the expectations of the public. Thus, the behaviour and appearance of the police in the media contains a touch of glamour that is hardly compatible with everyday routine. However, the roots of this conflict are far too complex to be solved between police and media in a particular situation and refer to a more complex social phenomenon.

The data shows that when we speak of the external communication of the police, the discussion revolves around the crucial relationship of the police and media. To summarize, this relationship can be characterized as one of mutual dependency and cooperation that is regarded as satisfactory from all participants, but still requires improvement in certain aspects.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

The EU-SEC Project *Coordinating National Research Programmes on Security during Major Events in Europe* was conceived in 2004 as a contribution of the United Nations to the configuration of an effective European Research Area in the field of security during Major Events. EU-SEC was funded by the DG Research of the European Commission and its Consortium is composed of 10 EU Ministries of the Interior, EUROPOL and UNICRI.

During four-year activities (2004-2008) the EU-SEC partners have intensively worked together through brainstorming meetings, studies and interviews with national experts. The results of these endeavours was the identification of subsequent elements required for the elaboration of an effective **methodology** for coordinating the national research activities on security at Major Events.

This Manual has summarised the research and analytical activities of the EU-SEC partners, highlighting the main elements of the developed methodology. This has included the following five fundamental steps:

- **Elaboration of common definitions:** the EU-SEC participating countries agreed to adopt some common definitions on three key concepts: ‘major event’, ‘research programme’ and ‘security’. The definitions were adopted after fruitful discussions among the EU-SEC countries, grounded in the practical experiences of respective national security planners. This was a remarkable exercise since a number of definitions already existed, but none were recognised as being universally applicable. The establishment of common definitions (especially on major event) was the first milestone towards the development of a common methodology among the EU-SEC countries.
- **Data collection and data analysis:** the second important element was to collect and analyse data on the existing national research programmes in the EU. A comprehensive questionnaire was completed by national security experts with the aim to capture both general information (leading organisations for national research programmes, main bibliographical references, etc.) and specific data on selected topics such as risk analysis, media management, and others. Data collection was not an easy task since ‘internal police research’ often relies upon tacit knowledge that police forces develop and share through debriefings, reflections, progress activity reports and assessment of past experience. The result was a state-of-the-art survey and the identification of strengths, weaknesses and gaps of national research programmes on security of major events.
- **Identification of benefits:** a further element was the identification of thematic areas that, according to the EU-SEC partners, should be further explored and studied. In particular, this fruitful exercise helped understand those research concerns which could benefit from the development of joint research activities within these thematic areas.
- **Proposals for joint research activities:** after the identification of main areas of concern, the EU-SEC partners have developed and approved five concrete proposals for joint research activities: STEP, EMER, EVES, RITES and a Field Test of the IPO Toolkit. It is important

to underline that the proposals were designed not only to effectively improve coordination of research activities among the partners, but also to develop pragmatic and sensible tools that national security planners may in the future use when planning for security at major events.

- **Available resources for joint research initiatives:** the last step was to explore which resources were available to develop the proposals and which obstacles may hinder their concrete application. The conclusion of the EU-SEC partners was that there are not significant barriers within the transnational cooperation, apart from some constraints in the sharing of personal data. On the contrary, there are a number of resources that can facilitate joint research activities, including EU and EC resolutions and recommendations to synchronise national research approaches, a well developed police networking system, practical experience accumulated during the planning and implementation of major event security, and significant lessons learnt, especially in the area of research programmes on security equipments.

In addition, the EU-SEC partners have explored opportunities for implementing joint research initiatives in cooperation with the private sector. PPPs are very important practices in the area of security, in terms of performance improvement and cost reduction. The EU-SEC group has promoted a pioneering “Call for Ideas” with the aim of involving private companies and research institutes in the elaboration of the proposals (STEP and EMER). The call was a very significant experience during which the EU-SEC partners identified some of the crucial elements that drive a successful PPP. This experience, together with all other conclusions of the Project, will certainly help the EU-SEC partners to effectively enlarge the scope of their activities and undertake the new challenge posed by EU-SEC II.